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ABSTRACT 
 
Not all Inequalities are Created Equal: Inequality Frames and Threat among Advantaged 
Groups 
 
by 
 
Tessa L. Dover 
 
 
The way we understand an inequality can depend on small differences in how the 
inequality is described. This research focuses on one subtle but potentially powerful 
difference in how inequalities are described: advantage vs. disadvantage framing. When an 
inequality is described using an advantage frame (e.g., “men have higher wages than 
women”), it puts the focus on the advantages held by the advantaged group. In contrast, when 
an inequality is described using a disadvantage frame (e.g., “women have lower wages than 
men”), it puts the focus on the disadvantages faced by the disadvantaged group. This 
dissertation investigates the hypothesis that when advantaged by an illegitimate inequality, 
individuals will avoid using advantage frames. I hypothesize that this will occur because 
focusing on one’s unfair advantages is more threatening that focusing on another’s unfair 
disadvantages. In four pilot studies and seven experiments (N = 2,669), I found tentative 
support for these hypotheses: In Studies 1-3, I found evidence that when advantaged by an 
inequality (but not when disadvantaged by an inequality), individuals were less likely to use 
advantage frames when the inequality they were describing was illegitimate (vs. legitimate). 
x 
 
This suggests that individuals may avoid using advantage frames when their group is 
illegitimately favored in order to avoid focusing on their unfair advantages. Studies 4-7 
investigated the role of threat in how individuals advantaged by illegitimate inequalities use 
and respond to inequality frames. I found that advantage frames prompted more 
cardiovascular threat than disadvantage frames among Whites preparing to discuss 
illegitimate racial inequality. However, I did not find concrete evidence for the two theorized 
mechanisms behind this threat, nor did I find direct evidence that threat influences which 
inequality frames individuals choose to use when describing the illegitimate inequalities. 
This research helps illuminate the potentially large effects of small linguistic differences in 
our descriptions of inequality. It also highlights the subtle ways that those who are 
advantaged by inequality may shift their descriptions of inequality to avoid challenges to 
their position. 
xi 
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Introduction 
“Women make 78 cents on a man’s dollar.” 
“Black Americans are much more likely to be unemployed that White Americans.” 
“Male scientists are treated with more respect than female scientists.” 
“Whites are promoted more frequently than Latinos.” 
 
The above statements all summarize existing group-based inequalities: unequal 
treatment, experiences, or outcomes based on group membership (see Loury, 2002; Shapiro, 
2004; Smeeding, 2006). Group-based inequalities surround us, though we may not often pay 
attention to how these inequalities are described. However, subtle linguistic differences in the 
description of group-based inequalities can affect the way we perceive and understand these 
inequalities (e.g., Chow & Galack, 2012). This dissertation investigates one of these 
linguistic differences: inequality framing. Inequality framing refers to the description of 
group-based inequality in a way that focuses either on how (1) the group on the bottom is 
worse off than the group at the top, or how (2) the group at the top has better outcomes than 
the group at the bottom (see Chow & Galack, 2012; Lowery, Chow, & Crosby, 2009; 
Lowery, Chow, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2012; Lowery & Wout, 2010).  
For example, the inequality “Black Americans are much more likely to be 
unemployed that White Americans” mentions that the group at the bottom (the disadvantaged 
group, Black Americans) is worse off than the group at the top (the advantage group, White 
Americans). This type of inequality frame is called a disadvantage frame because it focuses 
on the disadvantages of the disadvantaged group relative to the advantaged group. This same 
inequality could also be phrased “White Americans are much less likely to be unemployed 
that Black Americans.” Here, the description mentions that the advantaged group (White 
Americans) is better off than disadvantaged group (Black Americans). This type of inequality 
frame is called an advantage frame because if focuses on the advantages of the advantaged 
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group relative to the disadvantaged group. All group-based inequalities can be effectively 
described with a disadvantage frame or an advantage frame. And rationally, an objective, 
statistically-based inequality does not become more or less true, consequential, or important 
depending on the frame used to describe them.  
However, inequality framing does shape the way individuals perceive and 
conceptualize a given inequality (see Chow & Galuck, 2012). Specifically, disadvantage 
frames tend to focus our attention on the disadvantaged group, whereas advantage frames 
tend to focus our attention on the advantaged group. In this dissertation, I will investigate the 
role of inequality framing in shaping how those advantaged by inequality describe, 
understand, and respond to group-based inequalities. I specifically suggest that because 
advantage frames focus attention onto the advantaged group, they make inequality feel self-
relevant for the advantaged group. That is, more so than disadvantage frames, advantage 
frames focus the advantaged group on their own privileges. When that group-based 
inequality is illegitimate, I suggest that advantage frames will be threatening for those 
advantaged by inequality. Thus, I predict that individuals may seek to avoid using advantage 
frames in order to avoid experiencing the threat of focusing on their own illegitimate 
advantages. This research tests these hypotheses by investigating two main questions: (1) 
whether advantaged groups avoid using advantage frames in order to avoid the threat that 
accompanies focusing on their group’s illegitimate advantages, and (2) whether advantage 
frames are more threatening than disadvantage frames when advantaged by illegitimate 
inequality. These two main questions are depicted graphically in Figure 1.  
----------- 
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Figure 1. Simplified representation of the two major goals of the current research: first, on the top, 
assessing whether, when advantaged by inequality, the use of inequality frames (advantage vs. 
disadvantage) is partially determined by the psychological threat of focusing on one’s illegitimate group-
based advantages. Second, on the bottom, assessing whether when advantaged by inequality groups, 
advantage framing activates this threat more so than disadvantage framing. 
  ----------- 
Dealing with Illegitimate Group-Based Inequality 
In American society, some level of inequality is expected and even desired (e.g., 
Norton & Ariely, 2011). And many group-based inequalities are considered legitimate and 
fair. For example, many agree that it is fair and legitimate that pregnant women and those 
with disabilities have preferred seating on public transit. Most also agree that members of 
Native American tribes should have special privileges for how to use their land because of 
the history of European settlers forcibly acquiring the land. For other group-based 
inequalities, many agree that the inequality is unfair, or illegitimate. For example, most now 
agree that certain races should not have preferential access to public services or employment, 
and many believe that it is illegitimate to pay men and women differently for equivalent 
work. For other group-based inequalities, though, individuals will differ substantially in how 
legitimate they perceive the inequality to be. For example, some maintain that the gender gap 
in median incomes is illegitimate because it is the result of bias and discrimination. However, 
others maintain that the gender wage gap is legitimate because men and women make 
Psychological 
Threat 
Advantage (vs. 
Disadvantage) Inequality 
Framing 
Activates 
Determines 
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different choices and differ in their willingness to negotiate salaries (compare Lips, 2016 to 
Carnvale & Smith, 2014).  
Regardless of whether your group as advantaged or disadvantaged by an inequality, 
an inequality becomes more aversive when it is perceived to be illegitimate—based on 
factors besides merit or deservingness (Adams, 1963; 1965 Folger & Skarlicki, 2008; 
Homans, 1961; Messick & Schell, 1992; Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer & O’Doherty, 2010). 
Although illegitimate group-based inequality may be aversive for different reasons 
depending on whether you are advantaged or disadvantaged by the inequality, both 
advantaged and disadvantaged groups have been shown to engage in strategies to reduce the 
aversiveness of illegitimate inequalities. One strategy is attempting to reduce the illegitimate 
inequality itself. For example, members of disadvantaged groups may engage in collective 
action to gain status and equalize inequalities they consider illegitimate (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Even those who are benefitted by illegitimate 
inequality will in some cases endorse group-harming policies or change their behavior in 
order to reduce illegitimate inequality (Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962; Lowery, et al., 2012). 
 However, it is not always feasible to change illegitimate inequalities. In some cases, 
when presented with information that an inequality is illegitimate, individuals will legitimize 
or justify that inequality. That is, members of both advantaged and disadvantaged groups may 
construe inequality as legitimate and just in order to avoid the aversiveness of illegitimate 
inequality (see Jost & Major, 2001). For example, individuals can hold prejudiced views of 
disadvantaged groups, endorse or create stereotypes about groups, or employ system-
legitimizing ideologies in order to justify otherwise-illegitimate inequalities between groups 
(e.g., Jost & Banaji, 1994; Smith & Spears, 1996; Turner & Brown, 1978).  
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 If individuals do not change or justify illegitimate inequalities, they can also distance 
themselves from them by construing them as irrelevant to the self (e.g., Kluegel & Smith, 
1982). For example, members of disadvantaged groups often perceive lower levels of 
discrimination against themselves than against other members of their group (see Crosby, 
1984; Taylor, Wright, & Porter, 1994). This may occur because seeing illegitimate inequality 
is less aversive when its victims are more distant from oneself. Members of advantaged 
groups also distance themselves from illegitimate inequality. For example, Whites can 
construe the effects of illegitimate Black/White inequality as the result of a few prejudiced 
individuals as opposed to more systematic unfairness, thus distancing their own behavior 
from the illegitimate inequality (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). Advantaged groups may also 
physically distance themselves from reminders of illegitimate inequality (e.g., Goff, Steele, 
& Davies, 2008). In this way, they may be disentangling their own self from the illegitimate 
inequality, allowing them to feel less responsible for or implicated in the unfairness.  
In the current work, I conceptualize inequality framing as potential opportunity for 
advantaged individuals to distance themselves from illegitimate inequality. Specifically, I 
hypothesize that disadvantage frames (relative to advantage frames) allow an individual who 
is advantaged by illegitimate inequality to construe the inequality as separate from 
themselves. This is because disadvantage frames focus attention on the disadvantaged group 
rather than one’s own (advantaged) group. In contrast, advantage frames do not allow this 
distancing, but rather focus advantaged individuals on how the inequality benefits them. 
Advantaged groups, then, may avoid advantage frames when discussing illegitimate 
inequality.   
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An individual who is disadvantaged by an illegitimate inequality may also seek to 
distance themselves from illegitimate inequality through inequality frames. However, I 
suggest that distancing should be a more attractive strategy for advantaged groups than 
disadvantaged groups because advantaged individuals are less likely to want to change the 
inequality. Disadvantaged groups may not want to distance themselves from illegitimate 
inequality because they want to point out how the inequality harms them and their group. In 
this dissertation, I focus primarily on inequality frames among individuals advantaged by 
illegitimate inequality because my theory suggests that distancing should be a more 
promising strategy for advantaged groups than disadvantaged groups. However, I will also 
investigate how individuals disadvantaged by inequality may use inequality frames.  
Below, I review the literature on inequality framing. This literature indicates that for 
advantaged individuals, advantage framing makes inequality more self-relevant than 
disadvantage framing. Then, I review work supporting that the hypothesis that making an 
illegitimate inequality self-relevant is aversive and threatening for advantaged individuals, 
and that strategically using disadvantage rather than advantage frames may be a way for 
advantaged individuals to resolve or avoid this threat. 
Inequality Frames Help Determine the Self-Relevance of Inequality 
A small but growing literature on inequality framing has begun to investigate the 
impact of inequality framing on perceptions of and responses to inequality. One important 
way in which inequality frames shape perceptions of inequality is by helping to determine 
which party—the advantaged or the disadvantaged—is receiving the “normal” or “standard” 
treatment (Lowery et al., 2009). In one set of studies, participants learned about an unequal 
distribution of bonuses between two individuals. When the discrepancy was described as 
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person X receiving more than person Y (an advantage frame), participants reported that the 
appropriate bonus was similar to the disadvantaged person’s bonus. In contrast, when the 
inequality was described as person Y receiving less than person X (a disadvantage frame), 
participants reported that the appropriate bonus was similar to the advantaged person’s 
(Lowery et al., 2009). In other words, advantage frames imply that the disadvantaged party’s 
earnings are “standard” or “normal” and that the advantaged party has been over-
compensated. In contrast, disadvantage frames imply that the advantaged party’s earnings are 
standard or normal and that the disadvantaged party has been under-compensated. 
A similar set of studies replicated this basic effect, but looked at group-based rather 
than individual-level inequalities. Lowery and colleagues (2012) manipulated inequality 
framing with White American participants, describing inequality between Blacks and Whites 
as either Black disadvantage or White advantage. Specifically, White participants read 
information indicating that a company’s hiring practices were biased against Blacks 
(disadvantage framing) or biased toward Whites (advantaged framing). Participants then 
learned that a “tie breaker” affirmative action policy was under consideration at the company. 
This policy was described as either harming White applicants or helping Black applicants. 
Consistent with the view that inequality frames help determine which party’s treatment is the 
standard or norm, participants in the Black disadvantage condition were more favorable 
toward the Black helping policy than the White harming policy. That is, when the 
participants heard that Blacks applicants were being treated worse than Whites, they wanted 
to fix it by helping the Black applicants, not by hurting the White applicants. Conversely, 
participants in the White advantage condition were more favorable toward the White harming 
policy than the Black helping policy. That is, when participants heard that White applicants 
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were being treated better than Black applicants, they wanted to fix it by hurting the Whites, 
not by helping the Blacks. In other words, participants favored the equality-restoring strategy 
that matched the way in which that inequality was framed: participants wanted to harm 
Whites in order to bring them down to the ‘Black norm’ when Whites were described as 
unfairly advantaged. But participants wanted to help Blacks in order to bring them up to the 
“White norm” when Blacks were described as unfairly disadvantaged. This set of studies 
suggests that even when one’s own group is implicated in an inequality, advantage frames 
imply that the advantaged group is being treated better than the ‘standard’ treatment received 
by the disadvantaged group. Disadvantage frames, on the other hand, imply that the 
disadvantaged group is being treated worse than the ‘standard’ treatment received by the 
advantaged group. These studies support the idea that inequality frames function to define 
either the advantaged or disadvantaged group as the ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ group to which 
others are compared.  
Beyond demonstrating that inequality frames influence which group is being treated 
in the normal or standard way, this research indicates that inequality frames lead individuals 
to view an illegitimate inequality as being fair for one group and unfair to the other group 
(Lowery et al., 2009; 2012). Rationally, asserting that rewards or compensation are unfairly 
distributed among groups should imply both that the disadvantaged group is receiving unfair 
negative treatment and the advantaged group is receiving unfair positive treatment.  
However, the work on inequality frames supports the conclusion that individuals are quite 
adept at dissociating the effects of inequality on one group from the effects of inequality on 
the other group (Lowery et al., 2009; 2012). This suggests that members of advantaged 
groups are able to dissociate the effects of an inequality on their group from the effects of the 
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same inequality on the other group. That is, individuals appear to be able to consider 
advantage and disadvantage as two distinct phenomena rather than opposite sides of the same 
“inequality” coin. In this way, with a disadvantage frame, advantaged groups may be able to 
see their own outcomes as fair even when they acknowledge that the inequality itself is 
unfair.  
Although the idea has not been tested, the fact that inequality frames can shift the 
focus of an inequality onto either the advantaged group’s advantages (advantage framing) or 
the disadvantaged group’s disadvantages (disadvantage framing) suggests that inequality 
frames should influence how self-relevant a given inequality is for the groups involved in the 
inequality. Specifically, advantage frames should be self-relevant for advantaged groups 
because they focus on the how that group has more advantages than the ‘standard’ 
disadvantaged group. In contrast, disadvantage frames should be self-relevant for 
disadvantaged groups because they focus on how that group has fewer advantages than the 
‘standard’ advantaged group. So, for men, learning that “men make more than women” will 
make the inequality more self-relevant than learning that “women make less than men.” And 
for women, learning that “men make more than women” will make the inequality less self-
relevant than learning that “women make less than men.” This concept is represented in 
Figure 2a, which is part of a larger model that will presented in parts, and then as a whole 
(Figure 2). 
----------- 
10 
 
 
Figure 2a. Conceptual model depicting the effect of inequality framing on the self-relevance of a given 
inequality (Path A), depending on whether you are a member of the advantaged or disadvantaged 
group (Path B).  Full model is presented in Figure 2. 
----------- 
Some indirect evidence supports the argument that inequality framing make 
inequalities more or less self-relevant depending on your group’s relative status. In one set of 
studies, undergraduate participants either learned that Whites were advantaged on 
standardized tests (an advantage frame) or that Blacks were disadvantaged on standardized 
tests (a disadvantage frame; Lowery & Wout, 2008). Participants then reported their levels of 
perceived academic accomplishments and their self-esteem. For White participants in the 
disadvantage frame condition, academic achievement was positively related to self-esteem. 
In contrast, for White students in the advantage frame condition, academic achievement no 
longer predicted self-esteem.1 This finding—that Whites disengaged their self-esteem from 
their academic performance when an inequality was described using advantage frames but 
not disadvantage frames—suggests that advantage frames make advantaged groups more 
aware of their advantages than disadvantage frames. That is, a disadvantage frame did not 
imply that their academic performance depended on their group membership, whereas an 
advantage frame did. As such, they disengaged their views of self-worth from the potentially 
“tainted” marker of success. 
                                                 
1 The opposite pattern was found with Black participants: academic achievement predicted self-esteem with a 
(non-self-relevant) advantage frame, but did not predict self-esteem with a (self-relevant) disadvantage frame 
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In another study, White participants either received negative feedback or positive 
feedback on an intelligence test. The feedback that participants received did not influence 
how much participants acknowledged anti-Black discrimination. However, the White 
participants who received negative feedback acknowledged White privilege less than those 
who received positive treatment (Lowery, Knowles, & Unzueta, 2007). This finding—that a 
threat to one’s self lead to less acknowledgment of in-group advantages but not out-group 
disadvantages—is consistent with the idea that advantage frames are more self-relevant than 
disadvantage frames for advantaged groups. In the condition in which self-concerns were 
most salient (i.e., following negative feedback), White participants differed from their non-
threatened peers in their views about their own group’s advantages but not the other group’s 
disadvantages. This suggests a link between self-concerns and in-group advantage (but not 
out-group disadvantage) frames. 
 Together, this work suggests that for advantaged groups, advantage frames make 
inequality more self-relevant than do disadvantage frames. Below, I discuss why making 
illegitimate inequality self-relevant may be threatening for advantaged groups. 
 Self-Relevant, Illegitimate Group-based Inequality Threatens Advantaged Groups 
Several research programs have demonstrated that thinking about unfair benefits your 
group receives can have detrimental psychological effects. For example, relative to Whites 
who thought about unfair disadvantages they receive, Whites who thought about the unfair 
advantages they receive reported lower levels of self- and group-esteem (Branscombe, 1998) 
and endorsed higher levels of modern racist attitudes (Branscombe, et al, 2007). Similarly, 
Whites induced to think about their group’s advantages reported more guilt than Whites 
induced to think about other groups’ disadvantages (Powell et al., 2005), and Whites who 
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read about a company that favored White applicants reported less group-esteem than Whites 
who read about a company that disadvantaged Black applicants (Lowery et al., 2012). 
Together, this work suggests that thinking about one’s illegitimate group-based advantages is 
uncomfortable, can lead to guilt, and may encourage legitimization of the inequality.  
But is thinking about these illegitimate advantages threatening? I hypothesize that 
two types of threat underlie the aversive experience of considering one’s illegitimate 
advantages: self vs. system threat, and self vs. group threat. And I hypothesize that advantage 
framing prompts these threats more so than disadvantage framing when advantaged by the 
illegitimate inequality. Importantly, these threats should not be similarly present when 
disadvantaged by illegitimate inequality, and they should not be present when the inequality 
is perceived as legitimate. 
 Threat 1: Self vs. system. Most theoretical perspectives on the primary motivations 
of our psychological “self” agree that we have a basic motivation to see ourselves as having 
some sort of value or worth (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Greenberg, Solomon, & 
Pyszczynski, 1997; Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008; 
Steele, 1988). In many Western cultures (particularly mainstream American culture) value 
and worth are assessed with markers of achievement and status. This is reflected in the 
ideology of meritocracy: our merits are rewarded with status, and our status is determined by 
our merits (Kluegel & Smith, 1986). If we subscribe to the ideology of meritocracy, we are 
motivated to see ourselves as deserving of our accomplishments and status because these 
things reflect our self-worth. As such, when we see achievements and status being awarded 
based on factors like luck or nepotism rather than legitimate merits, we might question 
whether we really function in a meritocratic system. This ‘worldview threat’—the realization 
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that our beliefs about how the world works might be false—can have negative consequences 
ranging from hurt self-esteem (Major, Kaiser, O’Brien, & McCoy, 2007) to existential dread 
(Schimel, Hayes, Williams & Jahrig, 2007).  
Illegitimate inequality may call one’s worldview into question by suggesting that 
value, worth, and status are not distributed based on individual merits (as a meritocratic 
society would dictate), but are rather distributed based on arbitrary group memberships. 
However, only when the inequality is perceived as self-relevant should this challenge to 
one’s worldview actually result in psychological threat (see Lerner, 1980). For example, an 
individual can learn about an illegitimate inequality in a foreign country, see it as unfair, and 
feel troubled that individuals are not being afforded value in a way consistent with a 
meritocratic ideal. Yet this would not likely result in threat because it is unlikely that the 
individual would feel a strong need to resolve the conflict (see Steele, 1988). In fact, many 
people acknowledge that illegitimate inequality exists and that resources are not equitably 
distributed in their own social system (e.g., see Hartmann, Gerteis, & Croll, 2009). Yet they 
do not likely exist in a constant state of threat.  
When the illegitimate inequality is made self-relevant (e.g., through the use of 
advantage frames), however, I suggest that advantaged individuals will experience threat 
because it creates a conflict between (1) the motive to see yourself as having merit and (2) 
the recognition that the system may be unfairly awarding markers of merit. In other words, if 
our accomplishments and status are the product of our merit (as it should in a meritocracy), 
our accomplishments and high status are deserved. We can feel proud of them. If 
accomplishments and status are the product of our group membership and not just merit, 
however, our accomplishments and high status may be illegitimate. We are unsure whether 
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we have merit, so we do not know if we can be proud of our accomplishments and status. 
This conflict between the self (that has high status) and the system (that awards status 
illegitimately), I suggest, is a primary cause of threat that advantaged groups should 
experience when considering their own illegitimate group-based advantages (See Knowles, et 
al., 2014)  . As such, advantage frames should lead to more self vs. system threat than 
disadvantage frames. This hypothesis is depicted in Path C of Figure 2b. 
----------- 
 
Figure 2b. Conceptual model depicting the effect of making an inequality self-relevant on two forms of 
threat: Self vs. system threat (Path C) and Self vs. group threat (Path D).  The full model is presented 
in Figure 2. 
----------- 
Threat 2: Self vs. group. Several researchers have suggested that thinking about 
one’s own group-based advantages induces members of advantaged groups to recall and 
think about their group’s negative history and experience collective guilt (Powell et al., 2005; 
Schmitt, Behner, Montada, Muller, & Muller-Fohrbrodt, 2000; Leach, Iyer, & Pederson, 
2006; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003). For example, Knowles and colleagues (2014) theorized 
that inducing members of advantaged groups (specifically Whites) to think about their own 
advantages threatens them by reminding them that their group has an immoral history of 
oppression. Powell and colleagues (2005) found that reflecting on group-based privileges 
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resulted in collective guilt, or a sense that the group has acted wrongly (see Branscombe & 
Doosje, 2004). And Iyer and colleagues (2003) found that learning about past acts of 
injustice by in-group members led to feelings of guilt on behalf of the group as a whole. 
Together, this evidence suggests that being advantaged by illegitimate inequality may lead to 
negative feelings toward one’s group. Social identity theorists hypothesized and 
demonstrated that feelings about one’s social groups have important implications for 
personal wellbeing (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As such, advantage framing may be 
uncomfortable for members of advantaged groups because it indicates that one’s social group 
is not as positive as previously imagined.  
Yet while research supports the hypothesis that group members may be 
uncomfortable with suggestions that their group has negative qualities, other motives besides 
maintaining the reputation of one’s group may be at play when discussing or thinking about 
inequality. For example, many Whites in the US are motivated to avoid appearing racist or 
insensitive about racial inequalities (Goff, Davies, & Steele, 2008), are intrinsically 
motivated to act in egalitarian ways (Plant & Devine, 1998), and dedicate time and money to 
helping those “less fortunate” than themselves. As such, inequality may not just bring up 
concerns about maintaining our group’s image, but also concerns about seeing ourselves as 
moral and egalitarian.  
I hypothesize that for individuals thinking about their illegitimate advantages, these 
conflicting motives—the motive to maintain a positive image of our group and the motive to 
see ourselves as moral and egalitarian—result in self vs. group threat. This type of threat can 
be conceptualized as a categorization threat, in which an individual is lumped into a category 
to which they do not want to belong (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). In the case of 
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illegitimate inequality, this categorization threat takes the form of advantaged group 
members not wanting to be lumped into the category of people that benefit from the 
illegitimate inequality. For example, men may not want to be grouped together with sexist 
men, and Whites may not want to be grouped together with racist Whites. Importantly, this 
self vs. group threat should only occur among individuals that are motivated to see 
themselves as egalitarian and moral. However, as mentioned above, several lines of research 
suggest that at least among White Americans, many have a strong desire to appear egalitarian 
and morally opposed to racial inequality (Goff et al., 2008; Plant & Devine, 1998).  
Several findings suggest that advantaged groups experience self vs. group threat when 
confronted with illegitimate group-based inequalities. White Americans have lower levels of 
implicit and explicit identification with the group ‘White’ than other racial and ethnic groups 
have with their own racial/ethnic groups (Knowles & Peng, 2005), suggesting that most 
Whites do not have a strong desire to be classified into this advantaged group. Similarly, 
White Americans in situations where their White group membership is salient often attempt 
to demonstrate to others that they do not fit the stereotype of Whites as racist or intolerant 
(e.g., Goff, Steele, & Davies, 2008; Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Shelton, Richeson, Salvatore, 
& Trawalter, 2005) and want to act in ways that communicate non-prejudiced attitudes (both 
for political correctness concerns and for intrinsic reasons; Plant & Devine, 1998). Indeed, 
Goff and colleagues (2008) suggested that much of the discomfort experienced by Whites in 
interracial interactions stems from concerns about being perceived as a prejudiced or 
insensitive White person rather than racial animus per se. This suggests that at least for 
Whites in the US, being categorized as an advantaged group member may be aversive 
because it attaches negative qualities of the group to the self. Little research exists on how 
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members of other advantaged groups (e.g., men or heterosexuals) feel about being 
categorized as members of advantaged groups. Some research demonstrates that masculine 
and heterosexual identities are quite important and defended strongly (e.g., Glick, Gangl, 
Gibb, Klumpner, & Weinberg, 2007; Vandello & Bosson, 2013). This suggests that these 
groups may not be as averse to categorization as Whites are. Nevertheless, it may be 
reasonable to expect that most advantaged groups want to avoid categorization when those 
groups are construed negatively (Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997; 
Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Much like how individuals can see that the system is illegitimate without it 
necessarily being threatening (see section above), I suggest that advantaged groups can think 
about the negative aspects of their group without it necessarily being threatening. Consistent 
with this idea, Kluegel and Smith (1986) suggested that Whites often construe racial 
inequality as the result of individual prejudiced Whites as opposed to more systematic 
inequality. In this way, members of advantaged groups seem able to separate their own 
morality and egalitarianism from those of more stereotypically prejudiced group members. 
As such, when thinking about illegitimate inequality, advantaged groups may be able to 
construe out-group disadvantages as the product of the actions or attitudes of other members 
of their in-group and not themselves personally. However, when individuals think about their 
illegitimate advantages (i.e., when advantage frames are used), they may be induced to 
recognize that all members of their group—not just the stereotypically prejudiced ones—are 
implicated in the inequality. As such, I would expect that advantaged groups will experience 
more self vs. group threat following advantage frames than disadvantage frames. This 
hypothesis is depicted as Path D in Figure 2b (above). 
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The Role of Legitimacy 
 As mentioned above, not all group-based inequalities are illegitimate. Although I 
expect that advantage (vs. disadvantage) framing increases the self-relevance of group-based 
inequality for advantaged groups regardless of whether the inequality is perceived as 
legitimate, this self-relevance should only induce self vs. system and self vs. group threat 
when the inequality is illegitimate. When a group-based inequality is legitimate—based on 
differences in merit, motivation, ability, or deservingness—we should not expect self-
relevance to be threatening.  Rather, when the inequality is legitimate, we should expect 
increases in self-relevance to prompt pride in justly-earned accomplishments and positive 
feelings toward the group (see Leach, Snider, & Iyer, 2002). For example, if members of my 
soccer team are given a better prize than the other team because my team won a fair game, 
being reminded of my bigger prize should bring pride, not threat. In contrast, if my team won 
but the referee was biased, the other team was short a player, and my team-mate cheated, a 
reminder of my better prize might be threatening. In this way, I suggest that legitimacy will 
play an important role in whether advantage (vs. disadvantage) frames prompt threat. Only 
when an inequality is described or perceived to be illegitimate should advantage frames be 
more threatening than disadvantage frames. This moderating role of legitimacy is pictured in 
Figure 2c.  
----------- 
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Figure 2c. Conceptual model depicting the moderating role of legitimacy on the self-relevance’s effect 
on the two forms of threat (Path E). The full model is presented in Figure 2. 
 
----------- 
Psychological Strategies to Resolve Self vs. System and Self vs. Group Threat 
I hypothesized that two forms of threat result from framing illegitimate group-based 
inequality as advantaging the in-group—self vs. system threat and self vs. group threat. Both 
of these threats naturally suggest two mechanisms for resolving the threats. For self vs. 
system threat, advantaged groups can resolve this threat by changing (perceptions of) how 
meritorious the self is, or by changing (perceptions of) how fair the system is.  For self vs. 
group threat, advantaged groups can resolve this threat by changing (perceptions of) how 
much the self belongs to the group, or by changing (perceptions of) how moral and good the 
group is. The specific psychological strategies that I suggest advantaged groups will engage 
in to resolve these threats are depicted in Paths F-I in Figure 2, and are reviewed below. 
Figure 2 is the full conceptual model that will be referred to throughout the dissertation. 
----------- 
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Figure 2. Full conceptual model depicting the way in which inequality frames influence the self-
relevance, threat, and threat-resolving strategies among advantaged groups considering illegitimate 
group-based inequality. 
----------- 
Strategies to resolve self vs. system threat. Perhaps the most straightforward way to 
resolve self vs. system threat is to directly change how meritorious the self is or how fair the 
system is (see Knowles et al., 2014). There is some evidence that advantaged individuals will 
engage in behavior that concretely changes the self or the system to resolve threat. For 
example, over-compensated individuals in a work task changed their work habits to match 
their higher levels of compensation (Adams & Rosenbaum, 1962), suggesting that 
advantaged individuals will change their own behavior to “make up for” their perceived 
over-compensation. White participants will also endorse systematic changes that harm the in-
group when an inequality is presented as unfair advantaging their group (Lowery et al., 
2012), suggesting that it is possible to get members of advantaged groups to endorse policies 
that make the system less beneficial to them (see also Son Hing & Bobocel, 2002).2 
However, in the case of many group-based inequalities, it may not be feasible or plausible to 
make these changes. For example, neither members of advantaged or disadvantaged groups 
have much power to change the way their group is treated by society, and there may be few 
concrete paths to take in order for an individual to “make-up for” the positive treatment that 
they receive as a result of their group membership. Moreover, advantaged groups generally 
want to avoid systemic changes that involve giving up status (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As 
such, I suggest that the most likely methods of resolving self vs. system threat will take the 
                                                 
2 It should be noted, however, that the inequality used in this study was specific to a hypothetical 
company and thus participants were merely third-party observers (rather than members of the 
advantaged group). 
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form of (1) engaging in self-enhancement strategies in order to re-assert one’s worth and 
value, and (2) justifying the system. These strategies are described below. 
Self-enhancement. Engaging in self-enhancement can be conceptualized as an 
attempt to assure yourself that even if your group’s accomplishments are somewhat inflated, 
you are nevertheless personally meritorious enough to have earned your position. In other 
words, self-enhancement—by inflating one’s perceived worth and value—may allow 
members of advantaged groups to believe that they would have experienced positive 
outcomes even if they did not have group-based advantages. In the analogy of the soccer 
game, this might look like telling yourself that even if the team won illegitimately, you 
personally are talented enough that you still could have won in a fair game. This strategy is 
depicted as Path F in the conceptual model (Figure 2, above). 
System justification. Justifying an unequal system is a well-documented strategy for 
explaining and tolerating widespread group-based inequality (see Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost & 
Hunyady, 2005; Jost & Major, 2001). Justification, also called legitimization, is the process 
of construing inequality as the result of fair procedures and treatment. As such, inequalities 
between groups are seen as the result of the groups having different abilities or motivations, 
not bias, prejudice, or other unfair treatment. By reasserting the legitimacy of the system—
even when there is evidence that the system is unfair—an advantaged individual can see a 
group-based inequality as the result of fair processes as opposed to illegitimate ones. As 
such, they can maintain the belief that their accomplishments and positive outcomes are due 
to their own merits. In the analogy of the soccer game, this might look like convincing 
yourself that the referee was not actually biased, or that the other team’s lack of a player was 
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because that team had earned a penalty. This strategy is depicted as Path G in the conceptual 
model (Figure 2). 
Strategies to resolve self vs. group threat. As with self vs. system threat, the most 
straightforward way to reduce self vs. group threat may be to change one’s group 
membership or change the morality of the group. However, many groups have relatively 
stable boundaries and a long history of anti-egalitarian and even immoral behavior. As such, 
actually changing group memberships or the morality of the group as a whole is not likely 
feasible in many cases. As such, I suggest that the most likely methods of resolving self vs. 
group threat will take the form of (1) psychologically dis-identifying with the group, and (2) 
engaging in creative group-enhancement to assert the morality of the in-group. These 
strategies are describe below. 
Group dis-identification. Psychologically dis-identifying from one’s group can be 
conceptualized as an attempt to reject the categorization of one’s self in the in-group. This 
strategy has been identified as a coping mechanism with other forms of categorization threat, 
such as stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995): by denying similarity to or identification 
with the in-group, you can avoid applying the negative qualities of one’s group to the self. In 
the soccer game analogy, this might look attempting to leave the team, or throwing away all 
of your team gear so that you could not be identified as a member of the team. This strategy 
is depicted as Path H in the conceptual model (Figure 2). 
Creative group-enhancement. Creative group-enhancement can be conceptualized as 
an attempt to re-define one’s group as moral so that it is less threatening to be categorized as 
a member. Because the immoral history of slavery and patriarchy is so apparent and 
acknowledged in mainstream US culture, we might not expect group-enhancement to take 
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the form of defending the morality of stereotypical group members. Rather, I suggest that 
group-enhancement might be done creatively. Specifically, I suggest that it might take the 
form of downplaying the advantaged group’s oppressive nature and instead pointing out 
ways in which the group is itself disadvantaged or treated poorly. For example, members of 
advantaged groups may creatively enhance the morality of the group by pointing out the 
ways their own group is victimized or unfairly stereotyped (e.g., Norton & Sommers, 2011). 
In the soccer game analogy, this might look like reflecting back on past times your team has 
been treated unfairly. This strategy is depicted as Path I in Figure 2. 
Current Research 
 As mentioned above, this dissertation investigates two questions: (1) whether 
advantaged groups avoid using advantage frames in order to avoid the threat that 
accompanies focusing on their illegitimate advantages (top arrow in Figure 1), and (2) 
whether advantage frames are more threatening to advantaged groups than disadvantage 
frames (bottom arrow in Figure 1). Past work suggests that using disadvantage frames rather 
than advantage frames may be an effective way of distancing the self from an inequality 
(Lowery et al., 2007; Lowery & Wout, 2008). And advantaged groups may be motivated to 
distance themselves from inequality when it is illegitimate because illegitimate inequality 
prompts self vs. system threat and self vs. group threat. In contrast to the predicted effect of 
legitimacy on advantaged groups (less advantage frame use under conditions of illegitimacy 
than legitimacy), I do not expect the same pattern for  disadvantaged groups. Although I do 
not have strong predictions for how disadvantaged individuals might use inequality frames 
because this dissertation focuses primarily on the threat of thinking about one’s advantages, I 
do not expect to see the same pattern among advantaged and disadvantaged groups. This is 
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because disadvantaged groups likely have a different goal when thinking about inequality: 
they may want to change the inequality more than distance themselves from it. As such, I 
predict that:  
H1: When advantaged, but not when disadvantaged, individuals will use fewer 
advantage frames when the inequality is perceived to be illegitimate than when the 
inequality is perceived to be legitimate.  
 
This hypothesis addresses the first question of the dissertation: determining whether 
advantaged groups avoid using advantage frames in order to avoid the threat of illegitimate 
inequality. These hypotheses were tested in pilot studies, as well as Studies 1-3. In the pilot 
studies, I simply presented advantaged and disadvantaged participants with an illegitimate 
inequality and then measured how likely they were to use advantage vs. disadvantage frames 
when describing that inequality. In Studies 1-3, I manipulated and measured whether the 
participant was advantaged or disadvantaged (Studies 1 & 2), and manipulated and measured 
the legitimacy of the inequality (Studies 1, 2, and 3). I then measured how likely participants 
were to use advantage vs. disadvantage frames when describing the inequality. No published 
work that I know of has previously measured inequality frame use. In these studies, I 
predicted that members of advantaged groups, and not members of disadvantaged groups, 
would use fewer advantage when the inequality was illegitimate than when the inequality 
was legitimate. 
As reviewed above, I expect that the threat of focusing on one’s unfair advantages is a 
primary driver of why advantaged groups use fewer advantage frames when describing 
illegitimate (vs. legitimate) group-based inequality. As such, when advantaged group 
members are under threat (vs. not under threat), they should be more likely to avoid 
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advantage frames because they should be particularly motivated to avoid additional threats. 
Accordingly, I predict that: 
H2: When asked to describe an illegitimate group-based inequality, advantaged 
individuals will use fewer advantage frames when they are under conditions of threat 
than when they are not under conditions of threat. 
 
This hypothesis also addresses the first goal of the dissertation: determining whether 
advantaged groups avoid using advantage frames in order to avoid the threat of illegitimate 
inequality. I tested Hypothesis 2 in Study 4 by manipulating whether advantaged participants 
were under threat, then measuring their use of advantage and disadvantage frames when 
describing an illegitimate inequality. I manipulated threat by providing negative (vs. positive) 
feedback on an intelligence exam. 
The second question of the current research is whether advantage frames prompt self 
vs. system threat and self vs. group threat. Past work suggests that thinking about one’s 
illegitimate group-based advantages is more aversive than thinking about others’ illegitimate 
group-based disadvantages. I proposed that two specific forms of threat result from thinking 
about illegitimate group-based advantages: self vs. system threat (in which our desire to see 
the self as having value conflicts with the recognition that the system affords value unfairly), 
and self vs. group threat (in which our desire to see the self as moral and egalitarian conflicts 
with the recognition that our group is somewhat immoral and non-egalitarian). Moreover, I 
proposed that four distinct strategies may be employed by advantaged groups in order to 
resolve the threats that result from advantage frames: self-enhancement, system justification, 
group dis-identification, and creative group-enhancement. Consistent with this I predict that: 
H3: Advantaged individuals will be more likely to engage in self-enhancement, system 
justification, group dis-identification, and creative group-enhancement after being 
exposed to an illegitimate inequality described with advantage frames than the same 
inequality described with disadvantage frames. 
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H4: Advantaged individuals will be more likely to show behavioral and physiological 
markers of threat after being exposed to an illegitimate inequality described with an 
advantage frame than the same inequality described with a disadvantage frame 
 
Both of these hypotheses address the second question of the current research: whether 
advantage frames (more so than disadvantage frames) prompt threat when there is evidence 
that you are illegitimately advantaged. These hypotheses were tested in Studies 5-7. In 
Studies 5 and 6, participants read about an illegitimate group-based inequality that was 
described with either in-group advantage or out-group disadvantage frames. I then measured 
the four hypothesized threat-resolving strategies using self-reported scales. In Study 7, 
participants read about then discussed an illegitimate group-based inequality that was 
described with either in-group advantage or out-group disadvantage frames. As they read 
about and discussed the inequality, I measured indices of cardiovascular reactivity derived 
from the Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge and Threat (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & 
Mendes, 2010) in order to measure threat. 
Pilot Studies 
I first conducted four pilot studies to assess (1) whether there was variability in 
inequality frame use for two of the inequalities I planned to most often use: Black/White 
inequality and Male/Female inequality; (2) whether the stimulus materials were understood 
by participants; (3) whether disadvantage and advantage frame use was reliably code-able 
when participants summarized inequalities; and (4) whether there was initial support for the 
hypothesis that advantaged groups used fewer advantage frames when describing illegitimate 
(vs. ambiguously-legitimate) inequality.  
Method  
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In all pilot studies, participants read about or saw information about an inequality that 
did not contain any advantage or disadvantage frames. Participants then summarized the 
information in their own words (open-ended responses), and these responses were later coded 
for advantage and disadvantage frame use. Participants then completed a comprehension 
check that forced them to use either an advantage or disadvantage frame to describe the 
inequality (forced-choice responses). Pilot Studies 1 and 2 examined how White Americans 
described Black/White racial disparities in unemployment. Pilot Studies 3 and 4 examined 
how men and women describe gender disparities in wages. Pilot Studies 1 and 3 contained no 
information conveying that the disparities were illegitimate, whereas Pilot Studies 2 and 4 
implied that disparities were illegitimate. 
Pilot study 1. The first pilot study asked 168 self-identified White American mTurk 
workers (100 men and 68 women, aged 20-73, M = 34.38, SD = 10.58) to describe a graph 
displaying Black/White disparities in unemployment over time (graph presented in Appendix 
A). There was no information about the legitimacy of the inequality, leaving the legitimacy 
of the inequality ambiguous. Additionally, no advantage or disadvantage frames were used.  
Pilot study 2. The second pilot study asked 157 self-identified White American 
mTurk workers (79 men and 78 women; aged 20-74, M = 36.80, SD = 11.84) to describe a 
passage about Black/White disparities in unemployment. The passage (printed in full in 
Appendix A) did not contain any inequality frames. It also contained information that some 
reasons for the racial disparity were illegitimate (i.e., due to differences in opportunity; e.g., 
“Economists and social scientists have uncovered several reasons for this discrepancy, 
including difference in job training opportunities, different treatment by potential employers, 
difference in quality of education, and differences in the rate of incarceration.”).  
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Pilot study 3. The third pilot study asked male (n = 88, 48.6%) and female (n = 93, 
51.4%) mTurk workers (N = 181; aged 20-83, M = 35.37, SD = 11.57) to describe a graph 
displaying Male/Female pay disparities over time (graph presented in Appendix A). There 
was no information about the legitimacy of the inequality, leaving the legitimacy of the 
inequality ambiguous. Additionally, no advantage or disadvantage frames were used. 
Pilot study 4. The fourth pilot study asked male (n = 116, 58.6%) and female (n = 82, 
41.4%) mTurk workers (N = 198; aged 18-65, M = 33.27, SD = 9.99) to summarize a passage 
about the Male/Female pay disparities (see full passage in Appendix A). The passage 
contained no inequality frames, but it did imply that the inequality was illegitimate (e.g., due 
not to different choices, but different treatment by employers; e.g., “Economists and social 
scientists have uncovered much of this income disparity can be explained by differences in 
the way women and men are treated in the workplace.”).  
Measures. 
Open-ended responses. In all pilot studies, after seeing or reading the inequality 
stimulus participants briefly summarized, in their own words, the major points made in the 
passage. These open-ended responses were coded by two undergraduates (blind to 
hypotheses) who were trained to identify advantage and disadvantage frames. For each 
participant’s passage, the coders counted the number of advantage frames and disadvantage 
frames used. Coders agreed on 96.8% of codes, and I reconciled inconsistencies. Examples 
of open-ended responses and corresponding codes are presented in Table 1.  
----------- 
 
Response (all sic) 
#Adv. 
Frame 
#Dis. 
Frame 
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“There is a 28% difference in pay between men and women in 
america. Studies show that are are many different factors for 
this..” 
0 0 
“The graph shows unemployment rates for white and blacks 
throughout the decades. White unemployment has always 
been lower then black, but the trends in the graphs are very 
similar. 
1 0 
“Although men and women in America may do the same job, 
women make on average 28% less than mine. Women have 
many more obstacles to face as well.” 
0 2 
 
Table 1. Sample open-ended responses and corresponding codes (Pilot Studies) 
----------- 
Forced choice responses. After their open-ended response, participants completed a 
forced-choice measure of inequality frame use in which they were asked to summarize the 
information from the passage by filling-in a sentence that was missing words. From the word 
choices given, there were only two correct ways to complete the sentence: one being an 
advantage frame and the other being a disadvantage frame. In pilot studies 1 and 2, the 
sentence read: “In the United States, _______ Americans have a ________ unemployment 
rate than ______ Americans.” The participant could drag any of the following words into the 
blank spaces: male, higher, equivalent, White, Asian, lower, Black, Hispanic, female. The 
order of words in the word bank was randomized between participants. Participants who 
completed the sentence saying, “Black Americans have a higher unemployment rate than 
White Americans” were coded as using a disadvantage frame. Those who completed the 
sentence saying, “White Americans have a lower unemployment rate than Black 
Americans” were coded as using an advantage frame.   
In pilot studies 3 and 4, the sentence read: “In the United States, _______ tend to be 
paid ______ than ________.”  The word bank (again, with order randomized between 
participants) contained the words: men, women, Whites, Hispanics, Asians, immigrants, 
fewer, higher, more, less.   Participants who completed the sentence saying, “women tend to 
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be paid less than men” were coded as using a disadvantage frame. Those who completed the 
sentence saying, “men tend to be paid more than women” were coded as using an advantage 
frame. 
Results 
 Frequencies for both forced-choice and open-ended responses for all pilot studies are 
presented in Table 2.  
----------- 
 
Pilot Study Open-Ended   Forced Choice 
 
No  
Frame (%) 
#Adv. 
Frame (%) 
#Dis. 
Frame (%) 
χ2(1)  #Adv. 
Frame (%) 
#Dis. 
Frame (%) 
χ2(1) 
1 (Black/White Graph) 100 (59.5) 27 (30.7) 61 (69.3) 13.14***  92 (59.4) 63 (40.6) 5.43* 
2 (Black/White Passage) 32 (20.4) 29 (18.4) 129 (81.6) 63.29***  48 (32.7) 99 (67.3) 17.69*** 
3 (Male/Female Graph) 58 (32.0) 69 (55.2) 56 (44.8) 1.35 (ns)  123 (75.5) 40 (24.5) 42.26*** 
Men (advantaged) 32 (36.4) 30 (53.6) 26 (46.4) 0.29 (ns)  61 (80.3) 15 (19.7) 27.84*** 
Women 
(disadvantaged) 
26 (28.0) 
39 (56.5) 30 (43.5) 
1.17 (ns)  
62 (71.3) 
25 (28.7) 15.74*** 
4 (Male/Female Passage) 25 (12.6) 10 (5.5) 173 (94.5) 145.19***  31 (16.6) 156 (83.4) 83.56*** 
Men (advantaged) 15 (12.9) 7 (6.6) 99 (93.4) 79.85***  20 (17.9) 92 (82.1) 46.29*** 
Women 
(disadvantaged) 
10 (12.2) 3 (3.9) 74 (96.1) 
65.47*** 
 11 (14.7) 64 (85.3) 
37.45*** 
 Table 2. Frequencies (open-ended and forced choice) from Pilot Studies 1-4. 
----------- 
 Pilot Study 1 (Black/White graph).    
 Open-ended. 59.5% of participants did not use any inequality frames when 
summarizing the information in the graph about Black/White unemployment inequality. 88 
inequality frames were used by 68 participants (some used more than one inequality frame). 
There were more disadvantage frames (69.3%) than advantage frames (30.7%) used, χ2(1) = 
13.14, p < .001.  
Forced-choice. Thirteen participants (7.7%) did not provide a correct response. 
Among the correct responses, significantly more participants chose the advantage frame 
(59.4%) than the disadvantage frame (40.6%) to describe the racial inequality in 
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unemployment, χ2(1) = 5.43, p = .024. This differed from the pattern of results seen in the 
open-ended responses. 
Pilot Study 2 (Black/White Passage).   
Open-ended. 20.4% of participants did not use any inequality frames when 
summarizing the passage about illegitimate Black/White unemployment inequality. 158 
inequality frames were used by 125 participants (some used more than one inequality frame). 
Mirroring the findings from the first pilot study, there were more disadvantage frames 
(86.0%) than advantaged frames (14.0%) used, χ2(1) = 63.29, p < .001.  
Forced-choice. Ten participants (6.4%) did not provide a correct response. Consistent 
with the pattern seen with open-ended responses, and inconsistent with the forced-choice 
responses seen in Pilot Study 1, among the correct responses significantly more participants 
chose the disadvantage frame (67.3%) than the advantage frame (32.7%) to describe the 
illegitimate racial inequality in unemployment, χ2(1) = 17.69, p < .001. The finding that 
advantaged participants were less likely to use advantage frames in this study than in Pilot 
Study 1 is consistent with my prediction that advantaged groups are particularly unlikely to 
use advantage frames when the inequality is illegitimate (vs. ambiguously legitimate). In this 
pilot study, the inequality was portrayed as illegitimate, whereas there was no information 
about legitimacy in Pilot Study 1. 
Pilot Study 3 (male/female graph).    
 Open-ended. 32.0% of participants did not use any inequality frames when 
summarizing the information in the graph about Male/Female wage inequality. 125 
inequality frames were used by 123 participants (some used more than one inequality frame). 
There was not a significant difference in the number of disadvantage frames (55.2%) versus 
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advantage frames (44.8%) used, χ2(1) = 1.35, p = .245. Additionally, the disadvantaged group 
(women) did not significantly differ from the advantaged group (men) in their likelihood of 
using an advantage frame, χ2(1) = 0.88, p = .347. 
Forced-choice. Eighteen participants (9.9%) did not provide a correct response. 
Consistent with Pilot Study 1, in which the legitimacy of the inequality was ambiguous, 
among the correct responses, significantly more participants chose the advantage frame 
(75.5%) than the disadvantage frame (24.5%) to describe the gender wage disparity, χ2(1) = 
42.26, p < .001. Again, the advantaged and disadvantaged group did not differ in their 
likelihood of choosing advantage vs. disadvantage frames, χ2(1) = 1.77, p = .183.  
Pilot Study 4 (male/female passage).    
 Open-ended. 25 (12.6%) participants did not use any inequality frames when 
summarizing the passage about illegitimate Male/Female wage inequality. 183 inequalities 
were used by 173 participants (some participants used more than one inequality frame). 
Consistent with Pilot Study 2, in which the inequality was described as illegitimate, there 
were significantly more disadvantage frames (94.5%) than advantage frames (5.5%) used, 
χ2(1) = 145.19, p < .001. However, as in Pilot Study 3, participants’ group status (i.e., 
participants’ gender) did not affect likelihood of using an advantage frame, χ2(1) = 0.57, p = 
.452. 
Forced-choice. Eleven participants (5.6%) did not provide a correct response. 
Consistent with predictions, among the correct responses, significantly more participants 
chose the disadvantage frame (83.4%) than advantage frame (16.6%), to describe illegitimate 
gender inequality in wages, χ2(1) = 83.56, p <.001. However, as with the open-ended 
responses, men and women did not differ in their likelihood of choosing advantage vs. 
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disadvantage frames, χ2(1) = 0.33, p = .565. 
Discussion 
 In the four pilot studies, it appears (though is not directly tested) that participants 
were more likely to display the predicted pattern (using fewer advantage frames than 
disadvantage frames) when summarizing the passages than when summarizing the graphs. 
This may be a simple artifact of the stimulus, but it is also possible that those differences 
were partially due to the fact that the passages (and not the graphs) contained information 
implying that the inequality was illegitimate. This would support the Hypothesis 1, which 
predicts that advantaged groups will use fewer advantage frames when the inequality is 
illegitimate than when it is legitimate. However, this hypothesis needs to be directly tested, 
which I did in Studies 1-3. 
 Although there was some support for Hypotheses 1, the pilot studies did not indicate 
support for the part of the hypothesis predicting that advantaged groups would be more likely 
to avoid advantage frames than disadvantaged groups in the context of illegitimate 
inequality. In the two pilot studies that had participants from both the advantaged and 
disadvantaged groups (Pilot Studies 3 & 4), there were no differences in frame use depending 
on group status.  However, because I did not manipulate the legitimacy of the inequality, I 
could not formally test Hypothesis 1. I tested the role of group status more fully in Studies 1 
and 2.  
 The pilot studies also provided some methodological insights. Participants seemed 
quite able to correctly complete the forced-choice style of response (<8% answered 
incorrectly). Coders also agreed on most of the codes for the open-ended responses 
(agreement on > 96% of codes), indicating that it is feasible to accurately measure frame use 
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in responses from mTurk workers. Additionally, there seemed to be substantial variation 
between methods of measuring frame use: the likelihood of using an advantage frame in the 
forced-choice response often differed from the likelihood of using an advantage frame in the 
open-ended response.  
There was also substantial between-study variation in how often participants chose 
the advantage vs. disadvantage frames. For example, even though they were describing the 
same inequality (male/female wage disparities), participants chose advantage frames only 
16.6% of the time in Pilot Study 4, but 75.5% of the time in Pilot Study 3. For this reason, it 
seems feasible that inequality frames can be used flexibly and do not simply adhere to 
linguistic norms for describing inequalities.  
 In Studies 1-3, I directly tested Hypothesis 1: that when advantaged, but not 
disadvantaged, individuals will use fewer advantage frames when describing illegitimate 
inequality than when describing legitimate inequality. Study 1 assesses this hypothesis in the 
context of gender inequality. 
Study 1 
The goal of Study 1 was to fully test Hypothesis 1: that when advantaged but not 
when disadvantaged, individuals would use fewer advantage frames when describing 
illegitimate inequality than when describing legitimate inequality. My model predicts that 
making group-based inequality self-relevant is more threatening to advantaged groups when 
it is illegitimate than when it is legitimate (Path E in the conceptual model, Figure 2). 
Accordingly, advantaged groups should be more likely to distance themselves from the 
inequality by avoiding advantage frames when the inequality is illegitimate than when it is 
legitimate. For disadvantaged groups, however, I would not predict that individuals would 
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attempt to distance themselves more under conditions of illegitimacy (vs. legitimacy) 
because they are not at risk for the same types of threat as advantaged groups.  
In this study, I manipulated the legitimacy of gender inequality by manipulating 
expert opinions on why gender inequality persists within a passage about gender inequality. 
Members of both the advantaged and disadvantaged groups (men and women) participated, 
allowing me to test whether the advantaged group is more likely than the disadvantaged 
group to avoid advantage frames under conditions of illegitimacy. I predicted that for men 
and not women, reading about illegitimate gender inequality would lead to less use of 
advantage frames than reading about legitimate gender inequality. This is because men 
should only seek to avoid describing inequality in a self-relevant way when it is illegitimate 
and thus potentially threatening. I did not have specific predictions for how women would 
describe inequality, although I did not expect to see the same pattern hypothesized for men.  
Method 
Participants. Amazon mTurk workers (N = 409) participated in the study, though 7 
were excluded for failing attention checks and 5 additional participants were excluded 
because they did not report their gender. This left a final sample of 397 participants: 186 
women (46.9%), and 211 men (53.1%). Of these, 313 (78.8%) were White, 36 (9.1%) Asian-
American, 11 (2.8%) Latinx, 25 (6.3%) African-American, 10 (2.5%) biracial or multiracial, 
and 2 (.5%) unreported. Ages ranged from 18-74 years old (M = 33.54, SD = 11.03).  
Design. This study had a 2 (Status: advantaged vs. disadvantaged) x 2 (Legitimacy: 
legitimate vs. illegitimate) between-subjects design. Status was determined by whether the 
participant identified as a woman (disadvantaged) or a man (advantaged). Legitimacy was 
manipulated by describing workplace gender inequality as either due to choices made by 
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women and men (legitimate condition) or as due to bias in the workplace (illegitimate 
condition). 
Procedures & measures. The study was described to participants as an investigation 
of how individuals summarize social issues. Participants first read a brief passage describing 
workplace inequalities between women and men. The content of the passage varied by 
legitimacy condition. Those in the legitimate condition read that experts mostly agreed that 
gender inequality persisted because of the different choices made by men and women (e.g., 
 “Economists and social scientists have uncovered that many of these 
differences can be explained by differences in choices made by the men and 
women. For example, men and women have different priorities when it comes 
to working out of the house versus working in the house. Women and men also 
differ in how often they leave the workforce to take care of children.”  
 
Those in the illegitimate condition read that experts mostly agreed that the inequality 
persisted because of bias and prejudice in the workplace (e.g.,  
“Economists and social scientists have uncovered that many of these differences 
can be explained by biases in the way men and women are treated in the 
workplace. For example, women and men with equivalent job titles and skills 
often receive different bonuses, have different chances of being promoted 
despite equivalent job performance, and face different pressures at home.”  
 
Both of these passages are presented in Appendix A. Regardless of condition, no 
inequality frames were used in the passage. Moreover, the order in which men and 
women were mentioned varied throughout the passage and was counterbalanced 
between participants.  
Open-ended responses. After reading the passage, participants were asked to 
summarize the passage in their own words. The same two undergraduate coders as in the 
pilot studies counted the number of advantage and disadvantage frames in each response. 
Coders were blind to condition, participant gender, and hypotheses. Coders agreed on 91% of 
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the codes, and I resolved inconsistencies (blind to condition and participant gender). Sample 
responses and corresponding codes are presented in Table 3. 
----------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
----------- 
Forced-choice responses. As in the pilot studies, participants next completed a 
sentence by filling-in-the-blanks with words that created either an advantage or disadvantage 
frame.   Participants who completed the sentence saying, “women tend to be paid less than 
men” were coded as using a disadvantage frame. Those who completed the sentence saying, 
“men tend to be paid more than women” were coded as using an advantage frame. 
Perceived legitimacy. In order to assess whether the legitimacy manipulation was 
successful in affecting the perceived legitimacy of male/female inequality, I also assessed the 
perceived legitimacy of gender inequality using a three-item scale adapted from Miron and 
colleagues (2006) (e.g., “American society has reached the point where women and men 
have equal opportunities for achievement”, α = .864). Responses ranged from 1 (‘Strongly 
Disagree’) to 7 (‘Strongly Agree’), M = 3.56, SD = 1.50). This scale is presented in Appendix 
B. 
Results 
Response (all sic) 
#Adv. 
Frame 
#Dis. 
Frame 
“there is inequality between sexes. I think it will get 
better.” 0 0 
“Men and women are not treated fairly. Men make more 
money and get promoted more despite the equality in 
their performance.” 
2 0 
“The differences between male and female success and 
pay rates is based more on choices made, then by any 
form of bias against women.” 
0 1 
Table 3. Sample open-ended responses and corresponding codes (Study 1) 
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Inequality frame descriptives. 
Open-ended responses. Few participants used inequality frames at all in their open-
ended responses: 296 (74.6%) participants used no inequality frames. A non-systematic read 
of these open-ended responses suggests that this may be because participants tended to 
summarize the reason for the inequality more than just the content of the inequality. For 
example, many participants might say “Experts say that bias plays a big role in gender 
inequality” rather than “women tend to have worse outcomes in the workplace than men.” 
137 inequality frames were used by 101 participants (some used more than one inequality 
frame), and there were more advantage frames (n = 90, 65.7%) than disadvantage frames (n 
= 47, 34.3%) used, χ2(1) = 13.50, p < .001. Some participants, though not many, used 
multiple inequality frames in their open-ended responses. As such, it did not seem prudent to 
use a difference score (total number of advantage frames – total number of disadvantage 
frames) as a continuous dependent variable because there would be a very limited range with 
a large number of zeros. Because my theory predicts that advantaged groups will be driven to 
avoid advantage frames more so than they will be driven to use disadvantage frames, I 
decided to assess open-ended responses with a dichotomous variable: whether or not 
participants used an advantage frame at all in their open-ended responses.  This dichotomous 
variable will be the primary dependent variable used for assessing frame use in the open-
ended response for all future studies. 
Forced choice responses. Thirty-two (8.1%) forced-choice responses were incorrect 
or irrelevant. Mirroring the open-ended responses, among those who answered correctly, 
more participants chose the advantage frame (n = 244, 66.8%) than the disadvantage frame (n 
= 121, 33.2%), χ2(1) = 41.45, p < .001. 
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Effect of status and legitimacy.  
Perceived legitimacy of gender inequality. A 2x2 ANOVA with status (men vs. 
women) and legitimacy condition (legitimate vs. illegitimate) as between-subject factors 
revealed two main effects on perceived legitimacy of gender inequality. Men saw gender 
inequality as more legitimate (M = 4.05, SD = 1.37) than women (M = 3.00, SD = 1.45), 
F(1,393) = 54.14, p < .001. And consistent with the intent of the manipulation, participants in 
the legitimate condition viewed gender inequality as more legitimate (M = 3.93, SD = 1.44) 
than participants in the illegitimate condition (M = 3.19, SD = 1.47), F(1,393) = 25.43, p < 
.001. Status and legitimacy condition did not interact (p = .430), indicating that the 
legitimacy manipulation was similarly effective for men and women.  
Forced-choice. I predicted that for men but not for women, legitimacy condition 
would affect frame choice, such that men in the illegitimate condition would use the 
advantage frame less often than men in the legitimate condition (Hypotheses 1). I did not 
have specific predictions about women, though I did not expect that women would show the 
same pattern as men because they would not be similarly motivated to avoid the threat of 
illegitimate inequalities. 
A moderated logistic regression predicting likelihood of choosing the advantage (vs. 
disadvantage) frame revealed no main effects of status or legitimacy condition (ps > .32). 
There was, however, a significant status x legitimacy condition interaction, B = 1.04, SE = 
.45, p = .021, OR = 2.822, 95%CI [1.169, 6.811]. Follow-up simple slopes analyses were 
consistent with predictions: among women, legitimacy condition did not affect frame choice 
(p = .312). Among men, however, legitimacy condition did affect frame choice, B = -.708, 
SE = .310, p = .022, OR = .493, 95%CI [.268, .904]. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, among 
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men the predicted probability of using an advantage frame was higher in the legitimate 
condition (.735) than in the illegitimate condition (.578). In other words, men were more 
likely to use advantage frames when the inequality was described as legitimate (vs. 
illegitimate). Looking at this interaction differently, within the illegitimate condition, the 
likelihood of choosing the advantage frame was marginally lower among men (predicted 
probability = .578) than among women (predicted probability = .710), B = .580, SE = .313, p 
= .063, OR = 1.79, 95%CI [.968, 3.297]. There was not a significant difference between men 
and women in the legitimate condition (p = .157). This interaction is graphed in Figure 3.  
----------- 
 
Figure 3. Percentages of frame choice (forced-choice response) among men (left panel) and women 
(right panel) in both legitimate and illegitimate conditions. Study 1. 
----------- 
I next conducted a similar analysis substituting in self-reported perceived legitimacy 
rather than legitimacy condition as a predictor interacting with group status. This logistic 
regression revealed a similar pattern: there were no main effects of status or perceived 
legitimacy (ps > .290), but there was a marginal status x perceived legitimacy interaction, B 
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= -.300, SE = .163, p = .065, OR = .741, 95%CI [.538, 1.019]. Though this interaction did not 
reach conventional criteria for statistical significance, I followed-up the interaction with 
simple slopes analyses to assess whether the pattern of results mirrored those found with the 
legitimacy manipulation. As with the prior analysis, perceived legitimacy did not affect 
women’s likelihood of choosing the advantage frame (p =.565). For men, perceived 
legitimacy positively predicted likelihood of choosing the advantage frame, B = .235, SE = 
.116, p = .043, OR = 1.264, 95%CI [1.008, 1.587]. The predicted probability of choosing the 
advantage frame increased from .559 among men low (-1SD) in perceived legitimacy to .719 
among men high (+1SD) in perceived legitimacy. Put another way, men who perceived 
gender inequality as illegitimate were less likely to choose advantage frames compared to 
men who perceived gender inequality as legitimate. Looking at this interaction in a different 
way, among participants who perceived gender inequality be illegitimate (-1 SD), men were 
marginally less likely (predicted probability =.559) than women (predicted probability = 
.690) to choose the advantage frame, B = -.562, SE = .326, p = .085, OR = 0.410, 95%CI 
[.112, 1.031]. There was not a significant difference between men and women at high levels 
of perceived legitimacy (p = .355). This interaction is graphed in Figure 4. 
----------- 
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Figure 4. Perceived Legitimacy by Gender interaction on likelihood of using an advantage 
frame in the forced-choice. Study 1. 
----------- 
In order to assess whether perceived legitimacy mediated the relationship between 
legitimacy condition and frame choice among men (and not women), I tested a moderated 
mediation model using Hayes’ PROCESS macro (Model 15, see Figure 5). In this model, 
legitimacy condition predicted the likelihood of choosing the advantage frame directly, and 
also indirectly through perceived legitimacy. Participant gender moderated the direct path 
between legitimacy condition and frame choice, as well as the path between perceived 
legitimacy and frame choice. I used 10,000 bootstrap samples to estimate the indirect effects. 
This analysis revealed no evidence of an indirect effect among women, B = -.030, 95%CI[-
0.216, 0.201], and weak evidence of an indirect among men B = .148, 95%CI[-0.044, 0.406]. 
Specifically, for men, the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect (using 10,000 
bootstrapped samples) contained 0, as did the 90% confidence interval. An 89% confidence 
interval, however, did not contain 0, suggesting a non-significant but correct-direction 
indirect effect of legitimacy condition on frame use via perceived legitimacy (for men). 
Coefficients and significance levels for this model are presented in Figure 5. 
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----------- 
 
Figure 5. Moderated mediation model tested in Study 1 (PROCESS Model 15). 
 
----------- 
 
Open-ended. Few participants (25.4%) used inequality frames in their open-ended 
responses, and only 37 participants (9.3%) used an advantage frame; as such it may not be 
prudent to test a model predicting the likelihood of such a rare event. Nevertheless, a logistic 
regression predicting whether participants used advantage frame (or not) in their open-ended 
responses revealed no main effect of status (p = .146), but a main effect of legitimacy 
condition, B = 1.38, SE = .41, p = .001, OR = 3.980, 95%CI [1.768, 8.958], that was 
qualified by a significant status x legitimacy condition interaction, B = 1.87, SE = .93, p= 
.045, OR = 6.502, 95%CI [1.042, 40.574]. Unlike with the forced-choice responses, there 
was not a significant effect of legitimacy condition on likelihood of using an advantage frame 
for men (p = .334). Keep in mind, however, that the likelihood of men using any advantage 
frames was below 10%. There was a significant effect of legitimacy condition among 
women, B = 2.40, SE = .76, p = .002, OR = 11.026, 95%CI [2.496, 48.702]. This effect was 
in the opposite direction as the predicted pattern for men: women were less likely to use an 
advantage frame when they were in the legitimate condition (predicted probability = .023) 
than when they were in the illegitimate condition (predicted probability = .204). Again, 
Condition 
Frame Choice 
(Forced Choice) 
Participant Gender 
Perceived Legitimacy 
Interaction Total Effect B = 1.04* 
Interaction Direct Effect B = .89+ 
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extreme caution should be used in interpreting these results because of the rarity of advantage 
frame usage overall, and particularly among men.  
A similar pattern was found when substituting the (centered) perceived legitimacy 
variable for the experimental manipulation of legitimacy. Because of the issues outlined 
above regarding the rarity of advantage frame usage, I will not go further into this analysis, 
nor test a moderated mediation model.  
Discussion 
Study 1 tested Hypotheses 1 – that advantaged individuals (and not disadvantaged 
individuals) would use fewer advantage frames when describing illegitimate inequality than 
when describing legitimate inequality. As predicted, among those advantaged by the 
inequality (men in this study), illegitimacy was associated with less use of advantage frames 
in the forced-choice paradigm. Importantly, legitimacy (both manipulated and measured) 
affected frame choice in the predicted direction for men, but not for women. This is 
consistent with my prediction that the desire to avoid advantage frames when describing 
illegitimate inequality may be unique to advantaged groups.  
Although there was evidence for the predicted pattern with the forced-choice 
response, I did not find the exact same pattern when predicting the extremely rare use of 
advantage frames in open-ended responses. I also failed to find strong evidence that the 
perceived legitimacy of gender inequality mediated the relationship between legitimacy 
condition and frame choice among men. This is somewhat surprising because of the very 
similar patterns seen when predicting frame choice using either manipulated legitimacy 
condition or self-reported perceived legitimacy. However, this weak evidence may be 
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partially due to the fact that the effect of perceived legitimacy on men’s frame choice was 
only marginal. 
In Study 2, I attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1. But rather than using 
group membership as a proxy for status, I manipulated group status. Additionally, rather than 
using well-known and longstanding inequalities, I used a relatively novel inequality in order 
to assess whether less-entrenched inequalities can still prompt advantaged groups to avoid 
advantage frames when their advantages are illegitimate. 
Study 2 
In Study 2, I manipulated status by having UCSB students compare themselves to 
either a more advantaged UC campus (UCLA) or a less advantaged UC campus (UC 
Merced). Specifically, UCSB students learned that they had received more library funding 
than UC Merced, or that they had received less library funding than UCLA. I manipulated 
the legitimacy of the inequality by having the UC President describe the inequality between 
campuses as either fair or unfair. I then measured frame use with open-ended and forced-
choice responses. As in Study 1, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, I predicted that when 
UCSB students were in the advantaged position (but not in the disadvantaged position), they 
would use fewer advantage frames when the inequality was described as illegitimate than 
when it was described as legitimate. This is because UCSB students should only find their 
advantaged threatening when it is illegitimate, so they should only be motivated to avoid 
advantage frames when the inequality is perceived as illegitimate.  
Method 
Participants. UCSB students (N = 372) participated in the study in exchange for 
course credit. The sample was majority women: 262 (70.4%) women, 107 (28.8%) men, 1 
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(.3%) non-binary individual, and two unreported. The sample was relatively ethnically 
diverse: 109 (29.3%) White, 75 (20.2%) Asian or Asian-American, 116 (31.2%) Latinx, 13 
(3.5%) Black, 11 (3.0%) Middle-Eastern, 45 (12.1%) multi-racial, 3 (.8%) unreported or 
unclear. Ages ranged from 18-31 years old (M = 18.88, SD = 1.26). 
Design. This study employed a 2 (legitimacy condition: legitimate vs. illegitimate) x 
2 (status: advantaged vs. disadvantaged) between-subjects factorial design. Legitimacy was 
manipulated within the inequality stimulus by indicating whether the inequality was 
considered fair or unfair by the UC President. Status was manipulated by comparing UCSB 
to either UCLA (UCSB is disadvantaged) or comparing UCSB to UC Merced (UCSB is 
advantaged).  
Procedures & measures. The study was described as an investigation of how 
students understand issues facing the UC system. Participants first read an article ostensibly 
published in the UC Berkeley’s Newspaper The Daily Californian. This article described 
inequality in library funding within the UC system. Participants in the advantage condition 
read that UCSB received $40/student in library funding, whereas UC Merced received 
$20/student. Participants in the disadvantage condition read that UCSB received $20/student 
whereas UCLA received $40/student. No inequality frames were used in the article, and the 
order in which the school names were presented was counterbalanced.  
Participants in the legitimate condition read that UC president Janet Napolitano 
believed the inequalities were fair (e.g., “President Napolitano maintains that the 
discrepancies are fair. ‘The gap in funding is reasonable. Students at all of our universities 
have sufficient ccess to important research and learning materials,” says Napolitano”). 
Participants in the illegitimate condition read that President Napolitano believed the 
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inequalities were unfair and needed to be addressed (e.g., “President Napolitano agrees that 
the discrepancies are unfair. ‘The gap in funding is inexcusable. Students at all of our 
universities should have equivalent access to important research and learning materials,” 
says Napolitano”) See Appendix A for full articles. 
Open-ended responses. As in the previous studies, participants were asked to 
summarize the information in the article. Later, the same two undergraduate coders as in the 
previous studies counted the number of advantage and disadvantage frames in each 
summary. Coders were blind to condition and hypotheses. Coders agreed on 93% of the 
codes, and I resolved inconsistencies (blind to condition). Sample responses and 
corresponding codes are presented in Table 4.  
----------- 
 
Response (all sic) 
#Adv. 
Frame 
#Dis. 
Frame 
“The president of the UC's does not see the need for all of the 
UC's to be funded equally. She thinks that the funds should 
reflect the needs of the faculty and students of that school.” 
0 0 
“UCs are experiencing a distribution of unequal funds. For 
example, UCSB students would recieve $20 in library resource 
funds while UCLA students recieved double the amount..” 
1 0 
“The article states that according to the UC system, there are 
unfair treatments between the different schools in the UC 
system. Some schools (like Santa Barbara) are receiving more 
funds than other schools (like Merced). Some contradict this 
idea and thin it's a fair distribute.” 
1 0 
Table 4. Sample open-ended responses and corresponding codes (Study 2) 
----------- 
 
Forced-choice responses. As in the previous studies, participants completed a 
sentence in a way that created either an advantage or disadvantage frame. They completed 
the sentence “According to the UC president, students at ____ received ____ library 
resources than students at _____” with words from the following word bank (relevant words 
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in bold): UCSB, UC Merced, UCLA, fewer, more, equivalent, similar, heavier, lighter, UC 
Davis. The order in which the words were presented was randomized for each participant. 
Perceived legitimacy. A five-item scale was created to assess perceived legitimacy of 
the inequality described in the article (e.g., “The inequalities described in the article seem 
fair,” “The inequalities described in the article need to be addressed and corrected” – reverse 
scored; α = .833). Responses ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 
2.92, SD = 1.14. The full scale is presented in Appendix B. 
Results 
Inequality frame descriptives. 
Open-ended responses. All open-ended responses were correct and relevant, though 
about half (n = 208, 55.9%) did not contain any inequality frames. 199 inequality frames 
were used by 164 participants (some used more than one inequality frame), and as in Study 1, 
there were more advantage frames (n = 155, 77.9%) than disadvantage frames (n = 44, 
22.1%) used, χ2(1) = 61.92, p < .001.   
Forced choice responses. A surprisingly high number of participants had incorrect or 
irrelevant forced-choice responses (n = 62; 14.0%). Of the 310 correct and relevant 
responses, more participants chose advantage frame (n = 209, 67.4%) than the disadvantage 
frame (n = 101, 32.6%), χ2 (1) = 37.63, p < .001.  
Effect of status and legitimacy.  
Perceived legitimacy of inequality. A 2x2 between-subjects ANOVA indicated that 
participants viewed the inequality as more legitimate when they were the advantaged campus 
(M = 3.25, SE = .075, SD = 1.17) than when they were the disadvantaged campus (M = 2.58, 
SE = .078, SD = 0.99), F(1,366) = 38.69, p < .001. Additionally, as designed, participants 
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viewed the inequality as more legitimate in the legitimate condition (M = 3.25, SE = .078, SD 
= 1.16) than in the illegitimate condition (M = 2.58, SE = .075, SD = 1.02), F(1,366) = 37.51, 
p < .001. Status and legitimacy condition did not interact to predict perceived legitimacy (p = 
.297), indicating that the effect of the legitimacy manipulation was similar in both the 
advantaged and the disadvantaged condition. 
Forced choice responses. Contrary to Study 1 and to Hypothesis 1, a moderated 
logistic regression revealed that status and legitimacy conditions did not interact to predict 
choice of advantage (vs. disadvantage) frame for the forced-choice response (p > .500). 
There was a marginal main effect of status condition, such that those in the advantaged 
condition were marginally more likely to use advantage frames (predicted probability = .721) 
than those the disadvantaged condition (predicted probability = .621), B = .455, SE = .249, p 
= .067, OR = 1.576, 95%CI [.968, 2.567]. This may have been an artifact of participants 
choosing the frame that focused on their home campus, regardless of legitimacy condition. 
There was no effect of legitimacy condition and no interaction (ps > .108).  
As in Study 1, I conducted a parallel analysis with perceived legitimacy rather than 
legitimacy condition predicting, together with status condition, forced-choice responses 
(controlling for legitimacy condition). This analysis revealed the same significant main effect 
of status condition, B = .533, SE = .261, p = .042, OR = 1.703, 95%CI [1.021, 2.843] but no 
main effect of perceived legitimacy (p = .892). The status x perceived legitimacy interaction 
was not significant (p = .162) though the pattern of results was similar to Study 1: there was 
no effect of perceived legitimacy for those in the disadvantage condition, but there was a 
marginal effect of perceived legitimacy for those in the advantage condition, B = .252, SE = 
.151, p = .095, OR = 1.286, 95%CI [.957, 1.728]. Consistent with the pattern seen in Study 1, 
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advantaged participants were marginally less likely to use advantage frames when low in 
perceived legitimacy (-1SD; predicted probability = .545) than when high in perceived 
legitimacy (+1SD; predicted probability = .677). Also consistent with the pattern seen in 
Study 1, among participants who perceived the inequality be illegitimate (-1 SD), the 
advantaged group was marginally less likely to choose the advantage frame (predicted 
probability = .545) than the disadvantaged group (predicted probability = .746). This 
interaction is presented in Figure 6. 
----------- 
 
 
Figure 6. Perceived legitimacy-by-status condition interaction for likelihood of choosing the 
advantage frame in the forced-choice response. Study 2. 
----------- 
 
Open-ended responses. A moderated logistic regression predicting whether 
participants used an advantage frame (or not) revealed a main effect of status condition, B = 
.49, SE = .22, p = .026, OR = 1.625, 95%CI [1.059,2.494], and a main effect of legitimacy 
condition, B = .51, SE = .22, p = .020, OR = 1.670, 95%CI [1.085,2.570], but no interaction 
(p = .512). Those in the advantage condition were more likely to use an advantage frame 
(predicted probability = .419) than those in the disadvantage condition (predicted probability 
= .307), and those in the legitimate condition were more likely to use an advantage frame 
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(predicted probability = .427) than those in the illegitimate condition (predicted probability = 
.309).  
Although there was no interaction between status condition and legitimacy condition 
when predicting the likelihood of using an advantage frame in the open-ended response, there 
was an interaction between status condition and perceived legitimacy of the inequality 
(controlling for legitimacy condition), B = .73, SE = .22, p = .001, OR = .481, 95%CI 
[.310,.744]. However, as in the analysis of open-ended responses in Study 1, the effect of 
perceived legitimacy was unique to those in the disadvantaged condition. Among 
disadvantaged participants, higher perceived legitimacy was associated with a lower 
likelihood of using an advantage frame, B = -.59, SE = .18, p = .001. That is, the more 
disadvantaged participants perceived the inequality as illegitimate, the more likely they were 
to use advantage frames to describe the inequality. As in Study 1, this pattern among the 
disadvantaged group is opposite of the hypothesized pattern for the advantaged group. 
Perceived legitimacy did not predict frame use among advantaged participants (p = .308).  
Discussion 
This study did not provide clear evidence that the effects seen in Study 1 were 
replicable in a context where group status was experimentally manipulated and the inequality 
at issue was novel to participants. Although none of the findings went in the opposite 
direction of predictions, only one effect—the effect of perceived legitimacy on frame choice 
in the forced-choice response—was consistent with the patterns seen previously. That is, for 
participants in the advantaged condition (but not the disadvantaged condition), higher 
perceived legitimacy was marginally associated with higher likelihood of choosing the 
advantage frame. 
52 
 
In the open-ended responses, there was an effect of perceived legitimacy, but only for 
the disadvantaged group. Specifically, for the disadvantaged group, using an advantage frame 
was more likely when the inequality was perceived as illegitimate than when it was perceived 
as legitimate. This pattern, the opposite of what we expect and have seen with advantaged 
groups, mirrors the pattern seen in Study 1. It may suggest that disadvantaged groups may 
want to put the focus on the advantaged group when the inequality is illegitimate. Regardless, 
these findings do suggest that disadvantaged groups do not respond the same way to 
illegitimate inequality as advantaged groups, and that the pattern expected from Hypothesis 1 
is not seen in the disadvantaged group. As such, I will focus the rest of the studies only on 
the advantaged group. 
The weaker evidence for the hypothesized pattern among the advantaged group in this 
study (versus the first study) may reflect the fact that the inequality participants were 
considering was relatively ad-hoc and unfamiliar. Another potential artifact of this particular 
manipulation of inequality involves the fact that during the time of data collection for this 
study, UCSB had just finished construction of a new library. In the next study, I focused only 
on the advantaged group and attempted to use an inequality that more participants would be 
aware of and potentially threatened by. In addition, I sought to manipulate the legitimacy of 
inequality without manipulating any information given in the inequality stimulus. I did this 
by using a priming manipulation that activates legitimizing beliefs, which was presented 
separately from the inequality stimulus.    
Study 3 
The first goal of Study 3 was to replicate the findings from Study 1 (and, to a lesser 
extent, Study 2) on the role of legitimacy in determining the inequality frames used among 
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advantaged groups. A second goal was to manipulate the legitimacy of inequality without 
changing any information in the inequality stimulus, as was the case in Studies 1 and 2. In 
this study, White participants were asked to describe Black/White inequality in 
unemployment rates after being primed with legitimizing beliefs or not. Legitimacy beliefs 
were primed with a task that affects the accessibility of legitimizing beliefs. This task, in 
which participants unscramble sentences that reinforce the belief that hard work leads to 
success, has been previously shown to change how much discrimination individuals perceive, 
and how fair they think unequal treatment is (McCoy & Major, 2007; Wellman, Liu, & 
Wilkins, 2015). As such, participants primed with legitimizing beliefs should find inequality 
more legitimate than participants not primed with legitimizing beliefs. I used this 
manipulation in this investigation in order to cleanly separate the legitimacy manipulation 
from the inequality stimulus. All participants saw the exact same inequality stimulus, but half 
were manipulated to have legitimizing beliefs more accessible and thus perceive the 
inequality as more legitimate. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, I predicted that White 
participants would be more likely to use advantage frames when primed with legitimacy 
beliefs than when not primed with legitimacy beliefs. I hypothesized this pattern because 
participants should will be less motivated to avoid self-relevant inequalities when they 
perceive them as legitimate (vs. illegitimate).  
Method 
Participants. White Americans (N = 241) participated in the study via Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) feature. Of these, five participants failed attention checks, leaving 
a final analyzable sample of 236 (117 men, 117 women, 1 non-binary, and 1 unreported). 
Participants ranged from 19-68 years old (M = 34.56, SD = 11.01). 
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Design. This study was a two-cell between-subjects design, with participants 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions: legitimizing beliefs primed, or no prime control.  
Procedures & measures. The study was again described as an investigation of how 
individuals summarize social issues. Participants first completed a sentence-unscrambling 
task that differed depending on condition: in the legitimizing beliefs primed condition, 15 of 
the 20 sentences had to do with the ideology of meritocracy (e.g., “ambition moves you 
forward”). In the no prime control condition, none of the sentences primed meritocracy (e.g., 
“sunsets can be beautiful”). This manipulation of legitimizing beliefs was taken from McCoy 
and Major (2007) and has been shown to activate beliefs about the legitimacy of inequalities 
(see also Wellman et al., 2015). 
Inequality stimulus. Following the experimental manipulation, participants were told 
that they would see information about a social issue and then summarize the information. All 
participants then saw a figure that graphed US unemployment rates by race (Black vs. White) 
over time (identical to Pilot Study 1; see Appendix A). Because the stimulus was a graph, 
there were no inequality frames used. 
Open-ended responses. After viewing the graph, participants were asked to 
summarize the information. The same two research assistants from past studies, naïve to the 
hypotheses of the study and blind to condition, counted the number of advantage and 
disadvantage frames used in these responses. Coders agreed on 96% of codes, and I resolved 
all inconsistencies (blind to condition). Sample responses and corresponding codes are 
presented in Table 5.  
----------- 
 
Response (all sic) #Adv. #Dis. 
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----------- 
 
Forced-choice responses. Next, participants completed the forced-choice response 
measure. Participants who completed the sentence saying, “…Black Americans have a 
higher unemployment rate than White Americans” were coded as using a disadvantage 
frame. Those who completed the sentence saying, “…White Americans have a lower 
unemployment rate than Black Americans” were coded as using an advantage frame.  
Perceived legitimacy of inequality.  As in Studies 1 and 2, I assessed how legitimate 
participants perceived Black/White inequality in the US to be. I used three items adapted 
from Miron, Branscombe, and Schmitt (2006), e.g., “The existing inequalities between 
Whites and Blacks are justified” (α = .867). Participants responded to these items on a Likert 
scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 3.07, SD = 1.57. The 
full scale is presented in Appendix B. 
Results 
Inequality frame descriptives.  
Open-ended responses. In the open-ended responses, 35 participants used no 
inequality frames and 6 wrote irrelevant or un-code-able responses (e.g., “racism sucks!”). 
279 inequality frames were used by 195 participants (some used more than one), and far 
Frame Frame 
“The graph show unemployment rates over time with 
respect to ethnicity.” 0 0 
“It was about blacks vs Whites and unemployments 
rates.  Whites have lower rates.” 1 0 
“The graph shows that African Americans have a higher 
unemployment rate. Although they both peak at the 
same times, African Americans still rank higher in 
unemployment rate.” 
0 2 
 
Table 5. Sample open-ended responses and corresponding codes (Study 3) 
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more disadvantage frames (n = 265, 95.0%) than advantage frames (n =14, 5.0%) were used, 
χ2(1) = 225.81, p < .001. 
Forced-choice responses. Eleven forced-choice responses were incorrect or 
irrelevant (4.6%). Among the 225 correct responses, more participants chose the 
disadvantage frame (n = 190, 84.4%) than the advantage frame (n = 35, 15.6%), χ2(1) = 
106.78, p < .001. 
Effect of prime condition. Contrary to predictions, the priming manipulation did not 
affect the perceived legitimacy of Black/White inequality (legitimizing beliefs primed: M= 
3.05, SE=0.14; no prime: M= 3.09, SE = 0.15), F =0.04, p = .841.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly given that the priming manipulation did not affect perceived 
legitimacy, logistic regressions revealed no condition effects on frame use in either the open-
ended responses or forced-choice responses, ps > .120.  
Effect of perceived legitimacy. Although the manipulation failed to affect the 
perceived legitimacy of Black/White inequality, it was still possible to assess whether 
perceived legitimacy influenced inequality framing by using participants’ own perceptions of 
legitimacy as a predictor. A logistic regression predicting forced-choice frame use with 
perceived legitimaccy revealed a significant positive association between the perceived 
legitimacy of inequality and the likelihood of choosing the advantage frame, B = .363, p = 
.002, OR = 1.44, 95%CI [1.143, 1.808]. That is, the less legitimate participants perceived 
racial inequality to be, the less likely they were to use advantage frames. The probability of 
choosing the advantage frame was quite low overall (.164), but was higher when high in 
perceived legitimacy (+1 SD predicted probability = .226) than when low in perceived 
legitimacy (-1 SD predicted probability = .096).  
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A logistic regression predicting the likelihood of using an advantage frame in the 
open-ended response revealed no effect perceived legitimacy of racial inequality, B = .194, p 
= .287, OR = 1.21, 95% CI[0.850, 1.734]. However, only 12 (5.1%) participants used an 
advantage frame in their open-ended responses, so it is perhaps unsurprising that perceived 
legitimacy could not adequately predict such a rare occurrence.   
Discussion 
Study 3 indicated that although the manipulation of legitimizing beliefs did not 
successfully affect the perceived legitimacy of inequality or the likelihood of using advantage 
vs. disadvantage frames, individual differences in the perceived legitimacy of racial 
inequality did predict frame use in the predicted direction: the less legitimate participants 
perceived Black/White inequality to be, the less likely they were to use advantage frames 
when describing it. This replicates the effects seen among men in Study 1, and the pattern 
seen among advantaged students in Study 2. However, as in Studies 1 and 2, this effect only 
emerged with the forced-choice response, not the open-ended response. Again, this may be 
because so few participants used an advantage frame in the open-ended response (5.1%), 
whereas a more substantial proportion of participants chose the advantage frame in the 
forced-choice response (15.6%).  
I do not have a clear explanation for why the legitimacy priming manipulation was 
unsuccessful at manipulating perceived legitimacy of inequality. One possibility is that the 
prime was too subtle to be successfully used in an online study, where participants may have 
been distracted by other stimuli. Although this prime has been successfully used in online 
studies previously (Wellman et al., 2015), participants in that study responded to measures 
directly after the prime, not after seeing experimental stimuli as well. Another possibility is 
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that perceptions of this particular inequality may be relatively stable, and such a subtle 
priming manipulation was not sufficient to affect the perceived legitimacy of this well-known 
and long-standing inequality. 
As a whole, the first set of studies lends some support to the prediction that 
advantaged groups are less likely to use advantage frames when group-based inequality is 
perceived as illegitimate than when it is perceived as legitimate. The first two studies also 
indicated that this pattern was not the same for disadvantaged groups. These findings are in 
line with Hypotheses 1 – that avoiding advantage frames should be more likely for 
advantaged groups when the inequality is illegitimate (vs. legitimate), and that this effect 
should be more pronounced among advantaged (vs. disadvantaged) groups. 
These studies still lack, however, a clear mechanism for why advantaged individuals 
are using fewer advantage frames when describing illegitimate inequality. In my model, I 
predict that frame use is driven partially by a motivation to avoid the threat that accompanies 
thinking about your group’s illegitimate advantages (self vs. system threat, Path C in the 
conceptual model; and self vs. group threat, Path D in the conceptual model). However, the 
first set of studies did not directly assess the role of threat in frame use. As such, in Study 4, I 
manipulated threat in order to put advantaged participants in a psychological state where they 
are particularly motivated to avoid additional threats. I then measured inequality frames used 
when describing an illegitimate inequality. If advantaged individuals avoid advantage frames 
in order to avoid feeling threatened, then participants under threat should use fewer 
advantage frames than participants not under threat.  
Study 4 
59 
 
In Study 4, I directly investigated whether threat avoidance is one factor that drives 
members of advantaged groups to avoid advantage frames when describing illegitimate 
group-based inequalities. To do this, I manipulated threat by providing either positive (not 
threatening) or negative (threating) feedback on an ostensible test of intelligence. White 
participants then read about illegitimate racial inequality and were asked to summarize the 
information. As outlined in Hypothesis 2, I predicted that the participants under threat would 
be more likely than the participants not under threat to avoid advantage frames when 
describing the illegitimate inequality. 
Method 
Participants. White American Amazon mTurk workers (N = 259) participated in the 
study3, 14 of whom were excluded for failing attention checks. This left 245 White 
participants for analysis (50.2% female, ages 18-67, Mage = 34.96, SD = 10.61).  
Design. This study was a two-cell between-subjects design, with participants 
randomly assigned to receive either positive or negative feedback on an ostensible 
intelligence test. Those in the threat condition received negative feedback, and those in the no 
threat condition received positive feedback. 
Procedures & measures. The study was described as an investigation into the 
properties of a new intelligence test that contained two parts: a math & logic section, and a 
reading comprehension & writing section. The first portion of the test (math & logic) 
functioned as an opportunity to provide threatening or non-threatening intelligence feedback, 
and the second portion of the test (reading comprehension & writing) functioned as the 
inequality stimulus and dependent variables.  
                                                 
33 Additionally, 95 non-White participants and four participants who did not report their race/ethnicity 
participated and were excluded because the question only concerned White participants. 
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The math & logic section consisted of a single timed math problem in which one’s 
score was ostensibly calculated as a function of (1) time to correct answer and (2) penalties 
for incorrect responses. Participants were randomly assigned to answer a relatively easy 
question (in the no threat condition) or a relatively difficult question (in the threat condition). 
The math problems presented in each condition are printed in Appendix B. Participants in the 
no threat condition were told they answered the question correctly on their first try 
(regardless of their actual answer) and were told that they scored in the 89th percentile for 
people of a similar age and education level. Participants in the threat condition were told that 
they answered the question correctly if they indeed answered it correctly. If they did not 
answer it correctly on their first try, however, participants were told they answered 
incorrectly and given a second chance to answer the question correctly. Regardless of their 
answer on the second try, these participants were told they answered correctly after their 
second try. All participants in the threat condition then received feedback that they performed 
at the 13th percentile among people with a similar age and education level. These values were 
chosen based on Lowery, Knowles, and Unzueta (2007; Experiment 1).  
After receiving their feedback, participants immediately moved on to the second 
portion of the exam (reading comprehension & writing). Participants were asked to choose a 
number between 1-100, each of which corresponded to a passage. This was done to reduce 
suspicion that participants were specifically intended to read and write about racial 
inequality. Regardless of the number participants chose, they were assigned to read a passage 
titled “Racial Disparities in Unemployment in the United States.” This passage was identical 
to the passage used in Pilot Study 2 (see Appendix A), and it implied that the unemployment 
gap was due to bias and differences in opportunity. As such, all participants were exposed to 
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an illegitimate group-based inequality. The passage contained no inequality frames, and was 
counterbalanced regarding whether Black Americans or White Americans were mentioned 
first.  
Open-ended responses. As in the previous studies, participants then summarized the 
passage. Because the study was framed as an ostensible intelligence test, participants were 
told that their summary would be used to assess reading comprehension. Later, two 
undergraduate coders (one the same as in the previous studies and another new to the task) 
counted the number of  advantage and disadvantage frames used in each summary. Coders 
were blind to condition and hypotheses. Coders agreed on 95% of the codes, and I resolved 
inconsistencies (blind to condition). Sample responses and corresponding codes are presented 
in Table 6.  
----------- 
 
Response (all sic) 
#Adv. 
Frame 
#Dis. 
Frame 
“Whites have an unemployment rate of 5.3%.Black 
Americans have the rate of 11.7%.The  Bureau of Labor 
showed the  unemployment rates by race.The  gap 
between the two racial groups is the evident.” 
0 0 
“Black americans have a higher unemployment rate than 
white americans and have for the last 5 plus decades.” 0 1 
“White people have a lower rate of unemployment than 
black people.” 1 0 
Table 6. Sample open-ended responses and corresponding codes (Study 4) 
----------- 
 
 Forced-choice responses. Participants then completed the fill-in-the-blank style 
question that forced them to choose either an advantage or a disadvantage frame. Participants 
were told they were doing this in order to confirm that they read and understood the content 
of the passage.  
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Participants then provided demographic information, and reported how pleased they 
were with their performance on the two portions of the intelligence test (as a manipulation 
check). Finally, participants were debriefed. 
Results 
Manipulation check. As expected, participants were happier with their math & logic 
test score in the no threat (positive feedback) condition (M = 5.81, SD = 1.33) compared to 
the threat (negative feedback) condition (M = 3.32, SD = 1.70), F(1,243) = 160.073, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .397. Perhaps as a spill-over effect from their performance on the math & logic portion 
of the exam, participants in the no threat condition believed they did better on the reading 
comprehension & writing portion of the exam (M = 5.57, SD = 1.07) compared to 
participants in the threat condition (M = 5.25, SD = 1.10), F(1,243) = 5.046, p = .026, ηp2 = 
.020.  
Inequality frame descriptives. 
Open-ended responses. 75 participants (30.6%) did not use an inequality frame in 
their open-ended response. 214 inequality frames were used by 170 participants (some used 
more than one inequality frame), and there were more disadvantage frames (n = 178, 83.2%) 
than advantage frames (n  = 36, 16.8%) used, χ2 (1) = 94.22, p < .001. 
Forced choice responses. Participants were more also likely to choose the 
disadvantage frame (n = 153, 62.4%) than the advantage frame (n = 92, 37.6%) in the forced-
choice response, χ2(1) = 15.19, p < .001.  
Effect of threat manipulation.  
Forced choice responses. Inconsistent with my prediction that participants under 
threat would use fewer advantage frames than participants not under threat (Hypothesis 2), 
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threat condition did not affect frame choice in the forced-choice response, B = -.01, SE = .26, 
p = .961, OR = .987, 95%CI [0.588,1.658]. The probability of choosing an advantage frame 
was similar for participants in the threat condition (.374) as in the no threat condition (.377).  
Open-ended responses. Mirroring the finding above, threat condition also did not 
predict likelihood of using an advantage frame in the open-ended response, B = -.15, SE = 
.38, p = .698, OR = .862, 95%CI [.408, 1.823]. The probability of using an advantage frame 
was similar in the threat condition (.121) as in the no threat condition (.139).  
Discussion 
 In this study, there was no evidence that threatening feedback influences inequality 
framing for advantaged groups summarizing an illegitimate group-based inequality. This is 
contrary to Hypothesis 2, which predicts that advantaged groups should be more motivated to 
avoid advantage frames when they are under threat (vs. not under threat). As such, I have not 
found direct evidence that threat-avoidance (specifically the avoidance of self vs. system 
threat and self vs. group threat; Paths C and D, respectively, in the conceptual model) is a 
primary motivator of inequality framing for advantaged groups.  
One possibility for the lack of this effect is that the intelligence feedback 
manipulation did not actually threaten participants. Although participants in the threat 
condition reported being less happy with their performance than those in the no threat 
condition, it is possible that the negative feedback was not important or even believed by 
these mTurk participants who knew that the results of the exam would not have any true 
consequences. Another possibility is that even though half of the participants received 
positive feedback intended to be non-threatening, all participants felt somewhat vulnerable to 
threat while completing the study because their intelligence was being assessed. If this was 
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the case, then all participants—regardless of threat condition—may have been somewhat 
motivated to avoid advantage frames. Another related possibility is that because participants 
believed that their responses were part of an intelligence test, they may have been more 
concerned about providing a complete or impressive response, and their spontaneous or gut-
level responses were over-ridden.  
Nevertheless, the most parsimonious explanation for the lack of support for 
Hypothesis 2 is that my theory is not correct and that inequality framing is not actually 
motivated by threat avoidance. As such, in the next set of experiments, I directly assessed 
whether advantage framing is more threatening than disadvantage framing for advantaged 
groups learning about illegitimate inequality. I did this by manipulating whether an 
illegitimate inequality was presented with an advantage frame or with a disadvantage frame, 
and then measuring threat. Although this approach cannot definitively show that threat 
influences the inequality frames advantaged groups use to describe inequality, it can directly 
assess whether advantage frames are more threatening than disadvantage frames for 
advantaged groups (Paths C and D in the conceptual model). In studies 5-7, I evaluate 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 – that advantaged groups will display more behavioral and physiological 
indicators of threat, and will engage in more threat-resolving strategies, after exposure to 
advantage (vs. disadvantage) frames.   
In Studies 5 and 6, I manipulated inequality frames and measured the four threat-
resolving strategies hypothesized to follow from self vs. system and self vs. group threat 
(Paths F-I in the conceptual model). I only investigated responses to illegitimate inequalities 
and I only investigated responses of advantaged groups. As a review, my theory suggests that 
advantage frames will make inequalities more self-relevant to advantaged groups than 
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disadvantage frames (Path A in the conceptual model). When the inequality is illegitimate 
(Path E in the conceptual model), this self-relevance in turn activates two forms of threat: (1) 
Self vs. system threat results because our desire to see ourselves as having value conflicts 
with our recognition that the system affords value unfairly (Path C in the conceptual model). 
(2) Self vs. group threat results because our desire to see ourselves as moral and egalitarian 
conflicts with our recognition that our group is somewhat immoral and non-egalitarian (Path 
D in the conceptual model).  
Following from these hypothesized threats, four strategies are predicted to resolve 
self vs. system and self vs. group threat: (1) self-enhancement (Path F in the conceptual 
model) and (2) system justification (Path G in the conceptual model) are hypothesized to 
resolve self vs. system threat by re-establishing one’s own value and merit, and by re-
asserting the fairness of the system, respectively.  
(3) Group dis-identification (Path H in the conceptual model) and (4) creative group 
enhancement (Path I in the conceptual model) are hypothesized to resolve self vs. group 
threat by distancing oneself from other, less-moral members of the in-group, and by re-
construing the in-group as a victim rather than a perpetrator of illegitimate inequality, 
respectively. Higher levels of these threat-resolving strategies (self-enhancement, system 
justification, creative group-enhancement, and group disidentification) following advantage 
versus disadvantage frames would indicate that advantage frames induce more threat, which 
the participant must contend with by utilizing a threat-resolving strategy. These responses 
can be conceptualized as “defensive” or “dissonance-reducing” responses, and should be 
particularly pronounced when an individual is experiencing conflict between important views 
of the self and information that challenges those views (Festinger, 1957).  
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In Study 7, in addition to measuring the four hypothesized threat-resolving strategies, 
I indexed threat with cardiovascular responses during a discussion of inequality using the 
Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge and Threat as a framework (Blascovich, 2008; 
Blascovich & Mendes, 2010; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). The Biopsychosocial Model of 
Challenge and Threat holds that the psychological experience of threat can be indexed in the 
periphery by measuring cardiovascular responses during an engaging task. A cardiovascular 
threat pattern is theorized to result when the demands of a situation are perceived to outweigh 
the resources we have to deal with those demands. A cardiovascular challenge pattern, in 
contrast, is theorized to result when our resources meet or exceed the perceived demands of a 
situation. In the context of inequality framing, a cardiovascular threat response would be 
consistent with the idea that a participant thinking about illegitimate inequality is unable to 
effectively resolve the conflicts that arise when considering their in-group’s advantages. As 
such, I predicted that advantaged participants considering illegitimate inequalities would 
exhibit more cardiovascular threat when the inequality was framed in terms of in-group 
advantage rather than out-group disadvantage. It is important to note, however, that 
cardiovascular threat indices cannot differentiate between the two hypothesized forms of 
threat (self vs. system threat and self vs. group threat).  
Study 5 
 In Study 5, I manipulated whether illegitimate racial inequality (Black vs. White) was 
described using advantage or disadvantage frames. I then measured the extent to which 
White participants (advantaged) engaged in my hypothesized threat-resolving strategies. In 
this study, I measured one strategy hypothesized to resolve self vs. system threat (system 
justification, Path G in the conceptual model), and one strategy hypothesized to resolve self 
67 
 
vs. group threat (group dis-identification, Path H in the conceptual model). I only measured 
one threat-resolving strategy for each type of hypothesized threat for two reasons: First, I 
wanted to avoid participant burden and reduce the potential for earlier measures interfering 
with responses to later measures. Second, one threat-resolving strategy may be sufficient for 
alleviating the hypothesized threat. If multiple strategies for reducing the same type of threat 
were measured, engaging in one strategy might make participants less likely to engage in the 
other. Null effects, then, could indicate either that participants successfully alleviated with 
their threat with another strategy, or that participants were not threatened at all. The other 
two hypothesized threat-resolving strategies were measured in Study 6. 
 If my hypothesis is correct that advantage frames are more threatening to advantaged 
groups than disadvantage frames in the context of illegitimate inequality, then White 
participants considering illegitimate racial inequality should engage in more system 
justification and more dis-identification with the White racial group when the inequality is 
framed in terms of in-group advantage than when it is framed in terms of out-group 
disadvantage (Hypothesis 3). For this study, all participants were members of the advantaged 
group (White), and all participants read about illegitimate Black/White inequality. 
Method 
Participants. 314 self-identified White mTurk workers participated in the study in 
exchange for a small fee. Ages ranged from 20-71 (M = 37.77, SD = 11.54, 7 not reported). 
51.9% were women, 47.5% were men, and 0.6% (n = 2) were transgender or non-binary.  
Design. This study had a between-subjects design with two conditions: White 
advantage vs. Black disadvantage. Half of the participants read a brief passage describing 
racial inequality in a way that consistently used advantage frames (White advantage 
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condition), whereas the other half read the same information, but in a way that consistently 
used disadvantage frames (Black disadvantage condition). 
Procedures. After providing consent to participate in a study of how individuals 
understand current events and social issues, participants reported their demographic 
information. This was done in order to make sure participants were thinking about their 
White identity as they read about illegitimate racial inequality. Participants were then 
instructed to select a number from an array of numbers that corresponded to a passage about 
a current event or social issue (similar to Study 4). Regardless of the number they chose, all 
participants read about racial inequality in the United States. Half of the participants read 
about racial inequality in a way that consistently framed the inequality in terms of Black 
disadvantage (Black disadvantage condition), e.g.,  
“For example, Black citizens earn less than their White counterparts when doing the same 
type of work with the same educational background. Studies have also shown that Black job 
applicants are less likely than White job applicants to be called back for job interviews, even 
when their resumes are identical.” 
 
The other half read the same information, but in a way that consistently framed 
inequality in terms of White advantage (White advantage condition), e.g.,  
“For example, White citizens earn more than their Black counterparts when doing the same 
type of work with the same educational background. Studies have also shown that White job 
applicants are more likely than Black job applicants to be called back for job interviews, even 
when their resumes are identical.” 
 
These passages are presented in full in Appendix A. 
After reading the passage, participants responded to a multiple-choice comprehension 
check in which they chose the statement that most accurately summarized the information in 
the passage. The correct choice was phrased using the inequality frame that corresponded to 
the participant’s condition (“Black/White Americans are [dis]advantaged relative to 
White/Black Americans”). Participants who answered incorrectly were re-presented with the 
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passage and answered the question until they responded correctly. Across both conditions, 
five participants answered incorrectly on their first try. 
Participants then responded to the measures of threat-resolving strategies (system 
justification and ethnic dis-identification) in a counter-balanced order.  
Measures. System justification was operationalized with a scale measuring system-
justifying beliefs (SJBs). SJBs are a cluster of ideologies that all support the belief that the 
social system is fair. Endorsing these beliefs should help to resolve self vs. system threat by 
reassuring members of advantaged groups that their achievements were earned fairly.  I used 
an SJB scale used extensively in previous research that has three 4-item subscales (O’Brien 
& Major, 2005). The subscales include the Protestant Work Ethic (the belief that hard work 
pays off; e.g., “If people work hard they almost always get what they want”), belief in the 
Permeability of the social system (e.g., “Advancement in our society is possible for all 
individuals”), and the perceived Legitimacy of the social system (e.g., “Differences in status 
between groups in society are fair”), α = .94. Responses ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) 
to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 3.52, SD = 1.23. This scale is presented in Appendix B. 
Group dis-identification was operationalized with two indices: ethnic identification 
(the extent to which individuals feel that their ethnic group is an important part of their 
identity) and self-stereotyping (the extent to which individuals feel that they are similar to 
other members of their ethnic group). Rating oneself as low in ethnic identification and self-
stereotyping should help resolve self vs. group threat by allowing advantaged group members 
to separate their own sense of morality from the morality of the larger group. I measured 
ethnic identification with the 4-item identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem scale 
from Luhtanen & Crocker (1992; e.g., “Being White is an important reflection of who I 
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am.”), α = .88. Responses ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 
3.35, SD = 1.55. I measured self-stereotyping with two items from Leach et al. (2008; e.g., “I 
have a lot in common with the average White person.”), α= .93, r = .88. Responses ranged 
from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 4.63, SD = 1.33.  The full scales are 
presented in Appendix B. 
Participants next responded the same 3-item scale measuring perceived legitimacy of 
Black/White inequality from Study 3, M = 3.11, SD = 1.57, α = .85. Participants were then 
debriefed. 
Results 
System-justifying beliefs. Contrary to hypotheses (Path G in the conceptual model), 
participant did not endorse SJBs more after reading a passage about illegitimate racial 
inequality then it was described with advantage frames rather than disadvantage frames, 
F(1,312) = 0.23, p = .633, ηp2= .001. This null effect was mirrored when looking at the 
subscales of the SJB measure individually (ps > .472).  
Group dis-identification. Also contrary to hypotheses (Path H in the conceptual 
model), there was also no effect of condition on ethnic identification, F(1,311) = 1.55, p = 
.215, ηp2= .005, or self-stereotyping, F(1,311) = 0.14, p = .706, ηp2< .001.  
Perceived legitimacy. There were also no condition differences in the perceived 
legitimacy of Black/White inequality, F(1,311) = 0.52, p = .471, ηp2= .002. 
Exploratory analyses. The order in which the dependent variables were presented 
did not affect the effect of condition on system justification or group dis-identification. None 
of the above effects were moderated by gender (ps > .213). In addition, perceived legitimacy 
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of the inequality did not moderate the effect of condition on system-justifying beliefs or 
group dis-identification (ps > .355). 
Discussion 
 Study 5 provided no support for the hypothesis that reading about illegitimate racial 
inequality in a way that focused on White advantage was more threatening for White 
participants than reading about illegitimate racial inequality in a way that focused on Black 
disadvantage. Participants were not more or less likely to engage in the hypothesized threat-
resolving strategies: justifying the system (Path G), or dis-identifying with their racial group 
(Path H). One possible explanation for the failure to find support for my hypotheses is that 
both system-justifying ideologies and group identification are relatively stable individual 
difference variables. As such, it is possible that even if participants were experiencing threat, 
this threat it would not be sufficient to over-ride these relatively stable individual 
characteristics. As such, in Study 7, I examined changes in identification and system-
justifying beliefs in order to more sensitively assess the impact of inequality framing on these 
constructs. First, though, I conducted an almost identical experiment as Study 5 to assess 
whether inequality framing affected the other two hypothesized threat-resolving strategies: 
self-enhancement (Path F) and creative group-enhancement (Path I). 
Study 6 
 Study 6 was identical to Study 5 in every way except for the dependent measures. 
Again, I manipulated whether illegitimate Black/White inequality was described using 
advantage vs. disadvantage frames, and again I measured how much White participants 
engaged in two hypothesized threat-resolving strategies. In this study, I measured self-
enhancement as a potential strategy for resolving self vs. system threat (Path F), and I 
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measured creative group enhancement as a potential strategy for resolving self vs. group 
threat (Path I). Self-enhancement is hypothesized to help resolve self vs. system threat 
because it re-affirms the self’s value and worth. Creative group-enhancement is hypothesized 
to help resolve self vs. group threat by re-asserting the morality of the in-group. As I 
suggested above, it is unlikely that advantaged groups reading about illegitimate inequality 
will be able to group-enhance by simply asserting that the in-group is generally moral and 
egalitarian. This is because, especially for White Americans, it is difficult to deny that some 
members of the in-group are prejudiced and that the in-group has a history of immoral and 
anti-egalitarian behavior. As such, I predicted that group-enhancement would be done 
creatively in order to regain some of the group’s morality without completely denying past 
wrongdoings. Specifically, I proposed that advantaged groups would creatively group-
enhance by construing the in-group as victims of illegitimate inequalities (i.e., “reverse” anti-
White discrimination) in order to re-assert the in-group’s morality. If my hypothesis is 
correct that advantage frames are more threatening than disadvantage frames for advantaged 
groups reading about illegitimate inequality, then participants would be expected to show 
more self-enhancement and higher perceptions of anti-White discrimination in the White 
advantage vs. Black disadvantage condition.  
Method 
Participants. 301 self-identified White mTurk workers participated in the study in 
exchange for a small fee. Six participants did not finish the study and were removed from the 
analysis, leaving a final sample of 295 participants, aged 18-72 (M = 36.88, SD = 12.17), 
47.5% of whom were women.  
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Design & procedures. The study was identical to Study 5, except that the dependent 
measures differed. Rather than measuring system justification and group dis-identification, 
this study measured the hypothesized threat-resolving strategies of self-enhancement (Path F 
in the conceptual model) by having participants rate themselves on 40 positive and negative 
traits. Creative group-enhancement (Path I in the conceptual model) was measured with 
perceptions of anti-White discrimination. As in Study 5, the order of these measures was 
counter-balanced. 
Finally, participants responded to the same items assessing the perceived legitimacy 
of White/Black inequality and were debriefed. 
Measures. Self-enhancement was operationalized by having participants give 
themselves a percentile rank against “the average American” for 40 traits (20 positive and 20 
negative). Percentile ranks ranged from 0-100, and negative traits were reverse scored. All 
items were then averaged to create a measure of self-enhancement where higher values 
indicate more self-enhancement, α = .96. M =70.95, SD = 13.37. Consistent with Hypothesis 
3, I predicted that participants in the White advantage condition would score higher on this 
measure of self-enhancement than participants in the Black disadvantage condition because 
re-affirming the self’s value should help resolve self vs. system threat (Path F in the 
conceptual model). These traits are presented in Appendix B. 
I operationalized creative group-enhancement with a scale measuring anti-White (or 
“reverse”) discrimination (e.g., “Whites are victims of racial bias;” α = .90. Responses 
ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 4.13, SD = 1.51. I predicted 
that participants would have higher perceptions of anti-White discrimination in the White 
advantage (vs. Black disadvantage) condition, because perceiving the in-group as victims of 
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illegitimate inequality re-affirms the morality of the in-group and thus helps to resolve self 
vs. group threat (Path I in the conceptual model). The full scale is presented in Appendix B. 
As in Study 5, I also measured perceived legitimacy of Black/White inequality with 
the same three items (α = .86), which ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly 
Agree), M = 3.09, SD = 1.59. 
Results 
Self-enhancement. Contrary to Hypothesis 3 (Path F in the conceptual model, 
specifically), participants in the White advantage frame condition self-enhanced significantly 
less (M = 68.88, SD = 13.50) than participants in the Black disadvantage condition (M = 
73.09, SD = 12.93), F(1,291) = 7.43, p = .007, ηp2= .025. In other words, participants rated 
themselves less positively after reading about illegitimate White advantage than after reading 
about illegitimate Black disadvantage. The effect of condition on self-enhancement was 
similar for those completed the self-enhancement items first (p = .083) and those who 
completed them second (p = .042).  
Creative group-enhancement. I next assessed whether condition affected 
perceptions of anti-White discrimination. Contrary to Hypothesis 3 (Path I in the conceptual 
model, specifically) participants reported similar levels of perceived anti-White 
discrimination regardless of condition (p > .279). However, there was a marginal effect of 
condition in the predicted direction among the participants who answered these items before 
the self-enhancement items, F(1,150) = 3.106, p = .080, ηp2= .020. In contrast, there was no 
effect of condition for participants who answered self-enhancement questions first (p = .827). 
Among participants who answered the creative group-enhancement questions first, perceived 
anti-White discrimination was higher in the White advantage condition (M = 4.31, SD = 
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1.40) than in the Black disadvantage condition (M = 3.88, SD = 1.59). In other words, 
consistent with the pattern predicted by Hypothesis 3, participants perceived marginally more 
anti-White discrimination when the passage used advantage (vs. disadvantage) frames.  
Perceived legitimacy. As in Study 5, there was no significant effect of condition on 
how legitimate participants considered Black/White inequality, F(1,192) = 2.07, p = .152, 
ηp2= .007.  
Exploratory analyses. Gender and perceived legitimacy of Black/White inequality 
did not moderate the effect of condition on any of the dependent variables (ps > .174). 
Discussion 
 This study provided very limited support for the hypothesis that racial inequality is 
more threatening for Whites when it is framed in terms of in-group advantage rather than 
out-group disadvantage. Overall, frame condition may be affecting the likelihood of 
engaging in creative group-enhancement, in that participants who answered these questions 
directly after reading about the inequality perceived marginally more anti-White 
discrimination when the inequality was framed as White advantage (vs. Black disadvantage). 
The fact that this finding was only seen among participants who had not previously answered 
self-enhancement items might suggest that the opportunity to self-enhance may have 
alleviated any threat that might have otherwise prompted participants to engage in creative 
group-enhancement as a threat-resolvign strategy. This interpretation is consistent with 
Tesser’s concept of the “self zoo,” in which individuals are able to resolve a threat to the self 
in one domain through affirmation in another domain (see, e.g., Tesser, 2000; Tesser, 2001). 
That is, perhaps participants experiencing self vs. group threat following exposure to 
advantage frames were able to affirm themselves via self-enhancement so that they no longer 
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needed to resolve the threat via creative group-enhancement. When participants did not have 
the opportunity to affirm themselves via self-enhancement, however, they then engaged in 
the predicted threat-resolving strategy of creative group-enhancement. Although this is a 
possible explanation, additional investigations would be needed to assess whether it is 
replicable.  
Turning now to the effect of inequality frames on self-enhancement: this study found 
evidence that inequality frames affect self-enhancement in the opposite direction than 
predicted (Hypothesis 3, Path F in the conceptual model). White participants self-enhanced 
less following advantage framing than disadvantage framing. There are several potential 
interpretations of this finding. The first interpretation is that participants were more 
threatened by the Black disadvantage framing than the White advantage framing, and they 
thus self-enhanced more in the Black disadvantage condition. This interpretation is contrary 
to my hypotheses, as well as other findings suggesting that illegitimate in-group advantages 
are more aversive than illegitimate out-group disadvantages (e.g., Powell et al., 2005). 
However, it is nevertheless plausible.  
Another interpretation is that higher levels of self-enhancement did not index a threat-
resolving strategy as I predicted, but rather simply indexed self-esteem. That is, it is possible 
that participants in the advantage frame condition were experiencing self vs. system threat, 
but that they were not responding defensively to this threat (as I hypothesized in Hypothesis 
3). Rather, the lower levels of self-enhancement seen after reading about in-group advantage 
(vs. out-group disadvantage) may have reflected lower confidence in one’s abilities and 
worth. This interpretation would be consistent with my theory that reflecting on in-group 
advantages brings up doubts about whether one’s achievements and worth were fairly earned 
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(i.e., self vs. system threat; Path C in the conceptual model). However, it would be 
inconsistent with my predictions that advantaged groups would attempt to resolve this threat 
through increased self-enhancement (Path F in the conceptual model). Past work has 
interpreted reductions in self-reported self-esteem as an index of threat (e.g., Crocker, 
Voelkl, Testa, Crocker, & Major, 1991), and other work has shown that reflecting on in-
group advantages can lead to self-reported guilt and other forms of negative affect rather than 
only threat-resolving responses (e.g., Powell et al., 2005). As such, it seems possible that the 
lower levels of self-enhancement seen in the in-group advantage (vs. out-group disadvantage) 
condition reflect lower levels of positive self-feelings rather than lower levels of defensive 
responding. Threat is very challenging to measure using self-report scales because one 
defining feature of threat is that it motivates people to resolve the threat. As such, by the time 
participants respond to the scales intended to measure threat-resolving strategies, they may 
have already resolved the threat. As such, in the next and final study (Study 7), I directly 
measured threat using cardiovascular reactivity. This allowed me to measure immediate 
responses to inequality framing that were largely unfiltered through conscious processing or 
attempts at resolving the threat. 
Study 7 
The goal of Study 7 was to directly assess whether advantaged groups find 
illegitimate inequality more threatening when it is presented using advantage frames rather 
than disadvantage frames (Hypothesis 4). To more directly assess threat, I turned to the 
Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge and Threat (Blascovich, 2008; Blascovich & Mendes, 
2010; Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). This model uses peripheral markers of cardiovascular 
reactivity in order to differentiate states of challenge from states of threat. Within this model, 
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challenge is conceptualized as a motivational state in which perceived resources equal or 
exceed the perceived demands of a situation. It is marked by increases in output from the 
heart and increased vasodilation that promotes the efficient movement of blood to the 
periphery. In contrast, threat is conceptualized as a motivational state in which the perceived 
demands of a situation exceed perceived resources. It is marked by little change or a decrease 
in output from the heart, and increased vasoconstriction that functions to shunt blood away 
from the periphery and to the vital organs. Using peripheral markers of cardiovascular 
reactivity to index threat has several benefits: first, cardiovascular reactivity is largely 
controlled by the autonomic nervous system, which is involuntary and less susceptible to 
conscious control than other measures of threat. Second, because cardiovascular reactivity 
can assessed as participants engage in a task, we can assess threat simultaneously—rather 
than after the task or manipulation. One drawback to the use of cardiovascular indices of 
threat, however, is its lack of specificity. That is, we can assess whether participants are 
experiencing threat, but we cannot glean the type of threat experienced from cardiovascular 
reactivity. As such, we cannot differentiate between self vs. system threat and self vs. group 
threat when looking at the cardiovascular data. Accordingly, I also measured the same four 
threat-resolving strategies I investigated in Studies 5 and 6 (self-enhancement, system 
justification, group dis-identification, and creative group-enhancement).  
In this study, White participants again read about illegitimate Black/White inequality 
that either used advantage frames or disadvantage frames. Participants were then asked to 
speak about this inequality. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, I hypothesized that White students 
induced to discuss White advantage would experience more cardiovascular threat than White 
students induced to discuss Black disadvantage. I also assessed whether White participants’ 
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performance on a cognitively demanding task would be affected by the way the inequality 
was framed. I predicted that the greater threat experienced when discussing in-group 
advantage (vs. out-group disadvantage) might motivate participants to try harder on the task. 
This could be conceptualized as an attempt to re-affirm one’s merit in response to self vs. 
system threat. However, I also predicted that participants’ performance on the cognitively 
demanding task might be hindered by threat, and as such performance may be lower in the 
advantage frame condition than in the disadvantage frame condition. 
As in Studies 5 and 6, I measured the four hypothesized threat-resolving strategies 
(self-enhancement, system justification, group dis-identification, and creative group-
enhancement). In order to gain more sensitivity in detecting whether participants engaged in 
system justification and group dis-identification in response to threat, in this study I assessed 
changes in these variables rather than just post-manipulation levels.  
Overall, I predicted that White participants reading about and discussing illegitimate 
racial inequality would experience more cardiovascular threat, persist longer on a cognitive 
task, perform more poorly on a cognitive task, and engage in more threat-resolving strategies 
when the inequality was framed as White advantage than when was framed as Black 
disadvantage. The only exception to this is with the hypothesized threat-reducing strategy of 
self-enhancement. Given the findings from Study 6 that self-enhancement was lower 
following White advantage (vs. Black disadvantage) framing, I was agnostic about how 
framing condition would affect self-enhancement. 
Method 
Participants. Students at UC Santa Barbara who had self-identified as White in 
departmental prescreening (N = 106) were invited to sign up for the study in exchange for 
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partial course credit. Of these, one participant later identified as Latina at the end of the study 
so her data were discarded. Four participants chose “other/prefer not to say” or did not report 
their ethnicity, but were retained because they appeared phenotypically White and had 
chosen White as their ethnicity on the departmental pre-screen. As such, the final sample 
included 105 White students, aged 18-24, of whom 63.8% were women.  
Design. This study was a two-cell between-subjects design, with participants 
randomly assigned to read about and discuss racial inequality in a way utilized advantage 
frames (White advantage condition) or disadvantage frames (Black disadvantage condition). 
Procedures. Participants signed up for a study called “Discussing Current Events,” 
which was described as study of how individuals understand and discuss current events and 
social issues. After arriving and providing consent, participants were attached to the 
cardiovascular equipment (see more below). Participants then sat for a five-minute baseline 
cardiovascular recording, and then were given more information about the study. Participants 
were told that the goal of the study was to see how the body responds when discussing 
various social issues and current events. Participants would blindly choose two out of ten 
pre-selected topics, would read a brief passage about that topic, and then would answer 
several questions about each topic. We would record their cardiovascular responses as well 
as their audio/video in order to assess responses. 
Participants then chose a number from an array to “select” their first topic. All 
participants then read about a neutral topic: university exit exams. For two minutes, we 
recorded cardiovascular responses as participants read the passage about arguments for and 
against university exit exams, and then prepared for their discussion. They then answered 
three questions about exams aloud while we recorded audio/video and cardiovascular 
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responses. Questions were read aloud by a recorded voice and printed on a computer screen 
in front of the participant. A question was asked once every minute and participants were 
instructed to respond for the entire minute until they were interrupted. Participants discussed 
this neutral topic first so that (1) they would be less suspicious about the true question under 
investigation, so that (2) they would understand the process of the recording so any issues or 
misunderstandings would be worked out before discussing the critical topic (racial 
inequality), and so that (3) they would be less nervous about speaking in this paradigm 
generally, so responses to the critical topic would have less noise. 
Following their discussion of university exit exams, participants “selected” another 
topic to discuss. All participants then read about illegitimate racial inequality in the United 
States, but were randomly assigned to read a passage framing it in terms of White advantage 
or Black disadvantage (identical to Studies 5 and 6). Again, they read and reflected on the 
passage for two minutes while their cardiovascular responses were recorded, and then they 
began answering questions aloud. Participants answered five questions about the passage. 
The first four differed slightly between condition, and the last was identical for all 
participants:  
(1) “Based on the passage, how does being [White/Black] affect one’s life in the United 
States?”  
(2) “Please discuss any other examples from your own experiences or knowledge that 
demonstrate how being [white/black] can be [dis]advantageous in the United States.”  
(3) “What factors do you think might contribute to the average [white/black] person having 
[better/worse] outcomes than the average [black/white] person in the United States?”  
(4) “Please discuss why the [dis]advantages [white/black] Americans have are fair or not 
fair.”  
(5) “Overall, do you agree with the conclusions reached in the passage? Why or why not?” 
 
Immediately following these questions, participants were told they would be completing 
a task assessing verbal and spatial abilities. The instructions were designed to make the task 
feel self-relevant and diagnostic so that participants would be engaged and motivated to 
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perform well.  Participants then completed this task, which took the form of solving 
anagrams (word un-scrambling). Cardiovascular responses were measured for three minutes 
at the beginning of the anagram task. After the task, participants were unhooked from the 
cardiovascular recording equipment and answered dependent measures. Participants were 
then debriefed, probed for suspicion, and excused.  
Measures. 
Cardiovascular reactivity. Cardiovascular measures were assessed continuously 
during the five-minute baseline period, during each reading/preparation phase, during each 
discussion, and during the anagram task. Continuous blood pressure (BioPac monitor and 
amplifier Model NIBP100D), electrocardiography (Biopac amplifier Model ECG100C), and 
impedance cardiography (Biopac amplifier Model NICO100C) were collected in 
AcqKnowledge. I scored all indices except heart rate in the scoring program Moving 
Ensemble Analysis Pipeline (MEAP; Cieslak & Ryan, in preparation; see Cieslak et al., 
2015 for description). I scored heart rate in the program Mindware. The relevant indices 
(Heart Rate, Stroke Volume, Mean Arterial Pressure, Pre-Ejection Period) for each minute 
were then cleaned and combined to derive four indices used to measure cardiovascular 
challenge versus threat (according to the Biopsychosocial Model of Challenge and Threat; 
Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996): heart rate (HR), pre-ejection period (PEP), total peripheral 
resistance (TPR), and cardiac output (CO).4 I then computed reactivity scores by subtracting 
baseline values of each index from task values.  
                                                 
4 We followed four steps to clean the cardiovascular data. First, for each minute, I removed physiologically 
implausible values (HR between 40 and 300 beats per minute, Stroke Volume between 20 and 1000 mL, PEP 
greater than 0ms, Mean Arterial Pressure greater than 40 mmhg). Second, within each participant, I removed 
values from minutes that were more than ±3.00 SDs from the participant’s own mean. Third, with these cleaned 
data, I computed CO (CO = SV*HR), and TPR (TPR = ([MAP/CO]*80). Finally, I computed means for each 
task for each index by averaging the values for all the minutes in the given task. 
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Anagram task performance. Participants had up to two minutes to solve each of 
eight anagrams, which were presented on a screen one at a time. For each anagram, 
participants submitted their solution once they solved the anagram. However, participants 
could submit incorrect answers and could move on without solving the anagram. Three 
scores were calculated from this task: raw number of correct answers (out of eight; M = 5.19, 
SD = 1.51), time per correct answer (calculated by dividing total time taken to complete all 
eight anagrams by the number of correct answers; M = 46.87s, SD = 35.37s), and time per 
incorrect answer (calculated by dividing total time spent on incorrect/unanswered solutions 
by total number of incorrect/unanswered solutions). Participants who answered all anagrams 
correctly were assigned a score of 0; M = 95.80s, SD = 66.47s). Total score indexes overall 
performance on the task. Time per correct answer indexes efficient performance. Time per 
incorrect answer indexes inefficient perseverance.5 
Perceptions of social issues. Participants then answered several questions about the 
passages they read and discussed. This was done in order to see whether the way the 
inequality was framed affected how participants perceived the inequality. All responses 
ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree). Participants indicated (1) how well 
they understood the issue/argument presented in each passage, Mtopic1 = 6.12, SDtopic1 = 1.07; 
Mtopic2 = 6.29, SDtopic2 = 0.94; (2) how informative each passage was, Mtopic1 = 5.21, SDtopic1 = 
1.32; Mtopic2 = 5.44, SDtopic2 = 1.30; and (3) how biased the passage was (2 items: “The 
second passage I read [Racial Inequality in the United States] was written in a non-biased 
way;” “The author of the second passage [Racial Inequality in the United States] was biased 
in their presentation of the information”), Mtopic1 = 2.52, SDtopic1 = 2.00, αtopic1 = .76, rtopic1 = 
                                                 
5A coding error resulted in the loss of data from 15 participants on the anagram task.  
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.62; Mtopic2 = 4.26, SDtopic2 = 1.69, αtopic2 = .84, rtopic2 = .73. They also indicated (4) whether 
each topic was an important social issue (2 items: “The information in the second passage 
[Racial Inequality in the United States] is important for people to know about;” “The topic 
discussed in the second passage [Racial Inequality in the United States] is socially 
important”), Mtopic1 = 4.02, SDtopic1 = 1.43, αtopic1 = .75, rtopic1 = .59; Mtopic2 = 6.52 , SDtopic2 = 
0,85, αtopic2 = .84, rtopic2 = .75; (5) the extent to which they enjoyed discussing each passage, 
Mtopic1 = 4.24, SDtopic1 = 1.50; Mtopic2 = 4.91, SDtopic2 = 1.33; and (6) whether they would be 
interested in learning more about the topics discussed in each passage Mtopic1 = 4.07, SDtopic1 
= 1.91; Mtopic2 = 5.79, SDtopic2 = 1.40.  
Before completing additional dependent variables, participants then provided 
demographic information. This included their gender, age, ethnicity, perceived socio-
economic status, yearly family income, and political orientation. We asked demographic 
information at this point in order to make sure participants’ White identity was salient, and 
also so that I could ask questions related to their White identity without raising too much 
suspicion. 
Self-enhancement. As in Study 6, participants rated themselves against “the average 
American” on 40 traits (20 positive and 20 negative). Negative traits were reverse scored and 
all items were averaged to create a measure of self-enhancement where higher values 
indicate more self-enhancement, M = 72.94, SD = 9.22, α = .92.  
System justification. Next, participants completed the same 12-item measure of 
system-justifying ideologies as in Study 5, M = 3.26, SD = 0.92, α = .86.  
  Group dis-identification. Participants then responded to the same two items from 
Study 5 measuring self-stereotyping. The only difference was that we specified the ethnic 
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group in the stem (e.g., “I am similar to the average white person”). They also answered the 
4-item ethnic identification measure, again with the questions specified to relate to the white 
identity (e.g., “Being White is an important reflection of who I am”), M = 4.91, SD = 1.15, α 
= .92, r = .86.  
Creative group-enhancement. Next, participants responded to the same seven items 
measuring perceived anti-white discrimination, M = 3.52, SD = 1.26, α = .87. These items 
were identical to Study 6.  
Perceived legitimacy of inequality. Finally, participants indicated the extent to 
which they believe the inequalities between White and Black Americans are legitimate. This 
3-item scale was identical to the one used in Studies 3, 5, and 6, α = .86. All responses 
ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Strongly Agree), M = 2.20, SD = 1.20. 
Pre-Study Measures. During departmental pre-screening participants completed 
several individual difference measures. Of interest, they completed the same four-item ethnic 
identification scale that they completed during the laboratory session, M = 3.421, SD = 1.34, 
α = .84. The only difference was that in the departmental pre-screening, the items used the 
general term “a member of my racial/ethnic group” rather than “White.” Additionally, 
participants completed the same 12-item measure of system justification used in the 
laboratory session, M = 3.50, SD = 0.99, α = .89.  
Results 
Self-report. 
Perceptions of social issues. Means, standard deviations, and test statistics for all 
analyses or perceptions of the social issues are presented in Table 7. Participants reported 
that the passage about racial inequality was more biased and more enjoyable to discuss than 
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the passage about university exit exams, and participants also reported wanting to learn more 
about the racial inequality topic than the exit exam topic (ps < .001). However, these effects 
did not differ depending on whether the racial inequality topic was framed in terms of 
advantage vs. disadvantage. Participants also found the racial inequality topic more socially 
important than the exit exam topic, though this main effect was qualified by a marginal topic-
by-condition interaction, F(1,101) = 3.88, p = .052, ηp2 = .037). Racial inequality was 
perceived as more socially important than exit exams in both conditions, but this difference 
was larger in the disadvantage frame condition than the advantage frame condition. 
Interestingly, the movement was seen with perceptions of the importance of exit exams, not 
racial inequality. Participants agreed that racial inequality was quite important in both the 
advantage frame (M = 6.49, SD = 0.95) and disadvantage frame condition (M = 6.55, SD = 
0.73), F(1,101) = 0.13, p = .722, ηp2 = .001,  but exit exams were perceived as marginally 
more important in the advantage frame condition (M = 4.26, SD = 1.41) than disadvantage 
frame condition (M = 3.77, SD = 1.41), F(1,101) = 3.14, p = 0.079, ηp2 = .030. This 
interaction is presented graphically in Figure 8.  
----------- 
Measure 
Disadvantage 
Frame M (SD) 
Advantage 
Frame M (SD) 
Effect of 
Condition F 
Effect of 
Topic F 
Interaction 
F 
Understood      
Exit Exams 6.14 (1.04) 6.09 (1.10) 
0.01 (ns) 3.59+ 0.11 (ns) 
Racial Inequality 6.29 (0.91) 6.30 (0.96) 
Informative      
Exit Exams 5.08 (1.46) 5.40 (1.10) 
0.44 (ns) 2.76+ 1.83 (ns) 
Racial Inequality  5.45 (1.34) 5.43 (1.28) 
Biased      
Exit Exams 2.35 (1.15) 2.69 (1.41) 
2.34 (ns) 81.16*** < .01 (ns) 
Racial Inequality 4.07 (1.74) 4.43 (1.65) 
Important      
Exit Exams 3.77 (1.41) 4.26 (1.41) 
1.41 (ns) 318.04*** 3.88+ 
Racial Inequality 6.55 (0.73) 6.49 (0.95) 
Enjoyed      
Exit Exams 4.23 (1.51) 4.24 (1.52) 0.06 (ns) 21.42*** 0.22 (ns) 
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Figure 8. Condition-by-topic interaction for perceived importance of the social issue 
presented in the passage. 
----------- 
 
Threat-resolving strategies. Contrary to predictions, but largely consistent with 
Studies 5 and 6, there were no main effects of condition on any of the measures of threat-
reducing strategies (self-enhancement, system justification, group dis-identification, anti-
White discrimination). All means, standard deviations, and test statistics are presented in 
Table 8. Because participants had all previously provided measures of ethnic identification 
and SJBs in the departmental pre-screen, I also investigated whether results for these 
dependent measures changed when (1) controlling for prescreen levels of the measure, and 
(2) analyzing the difference between prescreen and post-manipulation values of the measure. 
None of these analyses yielded a significant effect of condition (ps > .100).  
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Importance of Social Issue Discussed
Advantage Frame Condition
Disadvantage Frame Condition
Racial Inequality 4.98 (1.31) 4.85 (1.35) 
Learn More       
Exit Exams 3.80 (1.86) 4.31 (1.93) 
1.84 (ns) 69.73*** 0.69 (ns) 
Racial Inequality 5.69 (1.56) 5.87 (1.25) 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics and tests of main effect of condition, main effect of topic (exit exams vs. 
racial inequality), and their interaction. +p < .10, ***p < .001. 
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----------- 
 
Measure 
Disadvantage 
Frame M (SD) 
Advantage 
Frame M (SD) F(1,101) p ηp2 
Self-Enhancement   73.33 (9.74)   72.58 (8.80) 0.17 .682 .002 
System-Justifying Ideologies 3.36 (0.97) 3.16 (0.88) 1.21 .275 .012 
White Identification 2.94 (1.13) 2.86 (1.08) 0.13 .722 .001 
Self-Stereotyping 4.99 (1.16) 4.84 (1.15) 0.42 .519 .004 
Reverse discrimination 3.52 (1.38) 3.51 (1.15)   < 0.01  .955 .000 
Perceived legitimacy  2.35 (1.33) 2.06 (1.06) 1.46 .230 .014 
 
Table 8. Means, standard deviations, and test statistics for self-reported DVs by condition. Study 7. 
----------- 
 
Anagram task performance. Participants did not differ by condition in the number 
of anagrams solved on the anagram task (p > .114). Participants also did not differ by 
condition in time per correct response, F(1,86) = 1.43, p = .236, ηp2 = .016, indicating that 
participants were not more or less efficient at solving anagrams in the disadvantage vs. 
advantage condition. There was, however, a significant main effect of condition on time per 
incorrect answer, F(1,86) = 4.38, p = .039, ηp2 = .048. Participants spent more time before 
giving up or submitting an incorrect answer in the advantage frame condition (M = 109.68, 
SD = 67.14) than in the disadvantage frame condition (M = 80.58, SD = 63.04). In other 
words, participants demonstrated more persistence (though ineffective persistence) after 
discussing White advantage vs. Black disadvantage, perhaps indicating an unsuccessful 
attempt to compensate for perceived threat in the advantage (vs. disadvantage) condition. 
Cardiovascular reactivity.  
Task engagement. The biopsychosocial model of challenge and threat specifies that 
participants must be engaged in the task at hand in order to accurately differentiate between 
cardiovascular threat and cardiovascular challenge. Task engagement is determined by 
assessing whether heart rate (HR) increases and pre-ejection period (PEP) decreases from 
baseline during the task under analysis. To test whether participants were engaged during 
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each task, I performed a series of MANOVAs testing PEP and HR reactivity against zero. 
Results indicated that participants were significantly engaged during both reading & 
preparation periods, both discussions, and the anagram task, Fs(2,101) > 6015.00, ps < .001).  
Threat/Challenge Index. Following prior research (see Blascovich et al., 2004), I 
calculated a Threat/Challenge Index for each task by standardizing both CO and TPR 
reactivity during each task, and then subtracting the standardized CO reactivity score from 
the standardized TPR reactivity score. With this measure, higher values indicate more threat 
relative to challenge. The formula for this index is as follows (where n represents the number 
of minutes in the task): 
Threat/Challenge Score =  ∑[𝑧(𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑖 − 𝑇𝑃𝑅𝐵𝐿) −
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝑧(𝐶𝑂𝑖 − 𝐶𝑂𝐵𝐿)]   𝑛⁄  
I winsorized Threat/Challenge scores that were greater than ±3 SDs from the sample 
mean. The least extreme of the extreme values for each winsorization was pulled in to the 
score equivalent to ±3.0 SDs from the sample mean. Then,  ± .01 was added to the value for 
each successively more extreme value in order to maintain rank order. In all analyses of the 
threat/challenge index, baseline values of TPR and CO were entered as covariates to adjust 
for the effect that initial values of these indices can have on reactivity scores.  
As expected, participants did not differ in their levels of cardiovascular 
threat/challenge depending on condition during their reading & preparation period or 
discussion of university exit exams (ps > .161).  
Frame condition did influence cardiovascular challenge/threat during the reading and 
preparation portion for the racial inequality topic, F(1,98) = 4.61, p = .034, ηp2 = .045. 
Specifically, as predicted, participants were more threatened in the advantage frame 
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condition (M = .322, SD = 1.67) than in the disadvantage frame condition (M = -.348, SD = 
1.74).  
Frame condition did not significantly influence cardiovascular challenge/threat during 
the discussion of racial inequality, F(1,100) = 1.29, p = .259, ηp2 = .013. However, a 
MANOVA looking at each minute of the speech as a repeated measure indicated a significant 
between-subject effect of condition, F(1,87) = 4.44, p = .038, ηp2 = .049, as well as 
significant or marginal effects of condition for every minute except the second. The 
multivariate analysis is presented in Table 9. 
----------- 
 
Minute 
Disadvantage 
Frame M (SD) 
Advantage 
Frame M (SD) F(1,87) p ηp2 
1 -.396 (1.818) .334 (1.472) 4.56 .035 .050 
2 -.179 (1.866) .196 (1.554) 1.54 .218 .017 
3 -.347 (1.742) .318 (1.740) 4.67 .033 .051 
4 -.397 (1.876) .318 (1.716) 4.70 .033 .051 
5 -.360 (1.763) .245 (1.774) 3.40 .069 .038 
 
Table 9. Means, standard deviations, and test statistics for MANOVA of the 
TCI index for the racial inequality discussion’s 5 minutes. Study 7. 
----------- 
 
Condition did not affect cardiovascular reactivity during the anagram task, F(1,96) = 
0.73, p = .394, ηp2 = .008. No multivariate effects were found on this task either. 
Discussion 
 Study 7 indicated that at a cardiovascular and behavioral level, inequality frames have 
an effect on White participants. White participants reading about and preparing to speak 
about White advantage experienced more cardiovascular threat than White participants 
reading about and preparing to speak about Black disadvantage. This finding was mirrored, 
though not completely, while speaking about inequality. Participants speaking about White 
advantage (vs. Black disadvantage) were also more persistent in a subsequent task, though 
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this persistence was inefficient. The fact that I found the predicted cardiovascular effect 
during reading/preparation portion provides a more conservative test of my hypothesis that 
advantage frames are more threatening that disadvantage frames. This is because the only 
condition differences were in the framing of the inequality, not in the content of the questions 
participants were asked to reflect on. One potential interpretation for why there was a 
stronger effect during the reading/preparation period than the discussion period is that 
participants were able to legitimize inequality, and thus reduce threat, in the process of 
actively discussing it. Another possibility is that racial discrimination is threatening to 
discuss regardless of how it is framed, and that there was somewhat of a ceiling effect during 
the discussion. In general, cardiovascular recordings have more variability and noise when 
speaking than when not. As such, it is also possible that cardiovascular artifacts during the 
discussion portion made it more difficult to detect the signal through the noise.     
 Although performance on the cognitively challenging anagram task was a secondary 
dependent variable, I found tentative evidence that being induced to consider in-group 
advantages leads to more inefficient persistence than being induced to consider out-group 
disadvantages. That is, participants spent longer before giving up when they had just 
discussed White advantage than when they had just discussed Black disadvantage. I 
interpreted this finding as evidence suggesting that advantage frames may make advantaged 
groups try harder to perform well on merit-based tasks, but that this additional effort is not 
necessarily successful because they are under threat.    
As in Studies 5 and 6, however, this study found little support for the hypothesis that 
inequality frame influenced the proposed threat-resolving strategies (self-enhancement, 
creative group-enhancement, group dis-identification, system legitimation; Hypothesis 3). 
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With these self-reported variables, there was no evidence that being presented with an 
inequality stimulus that focused on White advantage induced more threat-reducing strategies 
than a similar stimulus that focused on Black disadvantage. There are several possible 
reasons for these null effects. One interpretation is that advantage frames do not prompt 
threat that participants need to resolve. However, given the evidence that advantage frames 
do indeed prompt threat at a cardiovascular level, it is not likely that the lack of effects on the 
self-report variables is due to a lack of threat. Another interpretation is that even if 
participants are experiencing threat, the threat is not the result of the hypothesized 
mechanisms (self vs. system threat, self vs. group threat). Or, even if the threat is the result of 
those mechanisms, it is possible that these measures do not adequately capture attempts at 
resolving this threat. Finally, it is possible that the threat experienced is more fleeting than 
expected, and that threat was successfully resolved before answering these items. This would 
be consistent with the finding from Study 6 that inequality frame condition affected creative 
group-enhancement, but only when those questions were asked directly after exposure to the 
inequality stimulus. More studies will have to be undertaken in order to assess the 
mechanisms behind this threat, and whether individuals engage in any specific strategies to 
alleviate this threat. 
General Discussion 
 This dissertation assessed two major questions: (1) whether advantaged groups avoid 
using advantage frames in order to avoid the threat that accompanies focusing on one’s 
group’s illegitimate advantages, and (2) whether advantage frames are more threatening to 
advantaged groups than disadvantage frames.  
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In a series of seven studies, I found some evidence that advantaged groups do indeed 
use fewer advantage frames when discussing illegitimate inequalities than when discussing 
legitimate inequalities (Goal 1). I also found evidence that advantage frames are more 
threatening than disadvantage frames for advantaged groups (Goal 2). However, I failed to 
connect frame use to specific forms of threat: there was no direct support for my theory that 
advantaged groups avoid. Advantage frames partially because they want to avoid threat 
(Hypothesis 2), and there was no consistent support for my theory that advantage frames 
prompt self vs. system threat and self vs. group threat. A summary of the evidence for and 
against my theory is presented below. 
Studies 1-3 provided some evidence that individuals from advantaged groups are less 
likely to use advantage frames when the inequality is perceived or manipulated to be 
illegitimate versus legitimate. This is consistent with—though not direct evidence for—the 
hypothesis that avoiding advantage frames is a strategy for avoiding the threat associated 
with illegitimate inequality. However, evidence for this effect found only tentative support in 
Study 2, in which group status was manipulated. More investigations will be needed to assess 
whether this lack of replication reflects just an artifact of the particular study, or whether it 
reflects a more general effect in which manipulated, ad-hoc group inequalities are less potent 
than pre-existing group inequalities and thus promote less avoidance of advantage frames.  
   Study 7 provided evidence that for advantaged groups (Whites in this case), 
advantage frames are more cardiovascularly threatening than disadvantage frames. This is 
consistent with my hypothesis that advantage frames (more so than disadvantage frames) 
make inequality more threatening for advantaged groups (Hypotheses 3 and 4). However, 
Studies 5 and 6, which attempted to investigate the role of self vs. system threat and self vs. 
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group threat as mechanisms behind this threat, did not yield substantial insights into the 
forms of threat responsible for the cardiovascular reactivity pattern found in Study 7. One 
potential reason for finding the hypothesized effect of advantage vs. disadvantage framing 
with the cardiovascular measures but not the self-report measures is that the self-report 
measures did not adequately capture the threat that participants were feeling. Because the 
self-report measures were intended to measure threat-resolving strategies and not threat itself, 
it is possible that the threat experienced was resolved before participants responded to the 
measures, or that the two types of threat I attempted to measure were not the forms of threat 
responsible for the effects on cardiovascular measures seen in Study 7. Another possibility is 
that even if advantage frames are more threatening than disadvantage frames, this threat does 
not lead advantaged individuals to respond defensively. Rather, it is possible that these 
individuals experienced threat but did not feel threatened enough to necessitate defensive 
responses. A third possibility is that the self-report measures were not sensitive enough to 
detect the threat resulting from advantage vs. disadvantage frames. Whereas cardiovascular 
responses can change from second to second, most of the measures I used to assess threat-
resolving strategies are commonly used to measure more stable beliefs and traits. As such, 
these self-reported variables might not change as readily as the more flexible cardiovascular 
system. Perhaps another implicit measure that is less dependent on cognitive control might 
reveal similar patterns to the cardiovascular responses. 
 I also failed to find evidence that threat (or threat avoidance) drives frame choice for 
advantaged groups. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, participants were not more or less likely to use 
advantage (vs. disadvantage) frames when put under threat (Study 4). In the future, 
investigations should attempt to manipulate threat in a more direct or reliable way. I chose 
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the intelligence feedback manipulation because it previously had been shown to affect 
perceptions of White privilege among White participants (Lowery et al., 2012). Interestingly, 
the only self-reported dependent variable that was affected by inequality frames in a 
hypothesis-consistent way was perceptions of anti-White discrimination. Combined with the 
past evidence that threat manipulations affect perceptions of White privilege, this suggests 
that concern about one’s own privilege may be a promising avenue for future attempts to 
identify the type of threat that accompanies advantage frames. One potential threat 
manipulation might be more directly threatening one’s position in society or the legitimacy 
of the system. 
Future Research 
 Several questions still remain about the role of inequality frames in shaping 
conceptions of and responses to inequality. First, because these studies did not successfully 
capture the specific mechanisms behind the threatening nature of advantage frames, a priority 
will be developing methods and measures to better assess self vs. system threat and self vs. 
group threat as potential mechanisms. Capturing threat is a challenging undertaking 
regardless of the domain under study because it is somewhat fleeting: individuals resolve 
threat at different speeds, and it may become resolved before researchers are able to capture 
its effects with self-report measures. As such, perhaps a better strategy will be to induce 
several different types of threat and measure frame use (similar to Study 4). Additionally, the 
laboratory might be a better setting than online studies to capture these more fleeting effects 
because of their delicate nature. 
 Another important avenue for future research is to investigate whether the threat 
resulting from advantage (vs. disadvantage) frames has implications for intergroup behavior. 
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For example, it would be interesting to assess whether exposure to advantage (vs. 
disadvantage) frames leads to more distancing from members of disadvantaged groups (e.g., 
Goff et al., 2008), or whether inequality frames affect the likelihood that advantaged groups 
will take measures to reduce inequality. If the threat resulting from advantage frames can be 
“harnessed” for inequality-reducing behaviors rather than inequality-justifying behaviors, 
this would be beneficial for activists seeking to reduce inequalities. 
 Another area for future research is whether the type of groups involved in the 
inequality moderates the effects of inequality frames. I found evidence for the hypothesized 
effects among men and Whites, but not among UCSB students manipulated to be 
advantaged. This suggests that the effects may be limited to groups with a pre-existing 
history of inequality. That would be reasonable considering members of advantaged groups 
are more likely to feel threatened by their own illegitimate advantages if they have lived with 
and legitimized those advantages for their whole lives.  However, more research is needed to 
assess whether these effects extend beyond racial and gender inequality, and whether these 
effects can be found with more ad-hoc forms of inequality. 
 An obvious next step would also be an investigation of whether members of 
disadvantaged groups strategically use inequality frames. Studies 1 and 2 provide tentative 
evidence that disadvantaged groups may avoid disadvantage frames (i.e., frames that focus 
on their group’s disadvantages) when an inequality is illegitimate. This would suggest that, 
like the advantaged groups, disadvantaged groups may avoid frames that put focus on their 
own group when inequality is illegitimate. However, a more thorough consideration of the 
motivations of disadvantaged groups for employing or avoiding certain inequality frames is 
warranted. 
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 Finally, future research should investigate whether it matters whether members of 
advantaged groups consider themselves to be advantaged. Growing evidence suggests that 
members of traditionally high-status groups (Whites, men) feel that their status is declining 
and even beneath the status of traditionally low-status groups (people of color, women; see 
Norton & Sommers, 2011). In these studies, I categorized individuals as advantaged or 
disadvantaged based on group memberships, rather than allowing individuals to categorize 
themselves as advantaged or disadvantaged. It is an open question whether an individual’s 
perceptions of their group’s status makes a difference in their motivation to avoid certain 
types of inequality frames. 
Implications and Conclusions 
A substantial body of literature has investigated the discomfort associated with 
acknowledging group-based privileges (e.g., Branscombe, 1998; Branscombe et al., 2007; 
Powell et al., 2005). And more recently, a complementary literature has begun to assess the 
ways in which inequality frames influence the relevance of a given inequality to the groups 
benefitted or disadvantaged by that inequality (e.g., Chow & Galuck, 2012; Lowery et al., 
2009; 2012; Lowery & Wout, 2010). Whereas the research on privilege awareness has 
demonstrated several aversive emotional and attitudinal responses to reflecting on 
inequalities that are self-relevant, this dissertation is the first time an investigation has 
conceptualized and measured these aversive responses with a focus on self-relevance and 
threat. Moreover, many of the prior manipulations of privilege awareness tend to be heavy 
handed and induce individuals to think about the ways they personally have been benefitted 
by their group membership (e.g. Powell et al., 2005, Study 2). The current studies assessed 
whether more subtle manipulations of framing lead to threat. The evidence that simply 
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tweaking the way inequalities are worded induces cardiovascular threat has important 
implications for individuals consuming news and other media about inequality. Subtle 
changes in wording of inequalities may have cardiovascular impacts for members of 
advantaged groups. 
On the inequality framing side, previous work has demonstrated that inequality 
frames can influence which group is perceived to be more affected by the inequality, and that 
framing inequality in specific ways can allow individuals to downplay the effect inequality 
has on specific groups. This ability of inequality frames to decouple the effects of inequality 
on one group from the effects of the same inequality on the other group has important 
implications for how individuals choose and respond to inequality frames. However, those 
findings had not previously been brought together with the literature on privilege awareness 
to directly test whether advantaged groups avoid advantage frames in order to avoid the 
threat of acknowledging group-based advantages. Although the current studies did not 
provide conclusive evidence that threat or threat-avoidance is the motivator behind inequality 
framing, they nevertheless suggest that advantaged groups do indeed use inequality frames 
strategically, and that advantage frames are more threatening to advantaged groups than 
disadvantage frames. 
  Beyond theoretical implications, this research also provides insights into the 
assumptions and arguments that researchers and activists in other disciplines have made 
about advantaged group members and the acknowledgment of in-group advantages.  For 
example, many sociologists and social justice activists have suggested that advantaged 
groups avoid thinking about their own advantages and that this tendency functions to uphold 
inequalities (McIntosh, 1988; Pratto & Stewart, 2012). As such, many activists and scholars 
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support a strategy of educating advantaged individuals about their group-based advantages in 
order to induce them to take inequality more seriously and work to reduce it (McIntosh, 
1988). However, there is little evidence that pointing out advantages motivates advantaged 
group members to seek to reduce inequality. In fact, some attempts at increasing 
acknowledgment of group-based advantages through education have not been successful: a 
semester-long course on White privilege offered to White students who voluntarily enrolled 
in the course resulted in higher awareness of White privilege at the end (vs. beginning) of the 
semester, but no changes or even increased prejudice against racial minority groups; Case, 
2012). The current studies suggest that one potential barrier to motivating inequality 
reduction may be the heightened threat experienced when thinking about inequality in a way 
that focuses on the in-group’s advantages rather than the out-group’s disadvantages.  
This work also adds to a growing literature highlighting the potency of advantaged 
group identities and the ease with which these identities can be threatened (e.g., Craig & 
Richeson, 2014; Dover et al., 2016; Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014).  Although much work has 
investigated the ways in which disadvantaged groups experience identity threats, only more 
recently have scholars begun considering the substantial intergroup implications of threat for 
advantaged groups. These studies contribute to this body of work by pointing to how subtle 
linguistic changes in descriptions of inequality can threaten advantaged groups, and by 
suggesting that advantaged groups may strategically avoid or employ these linguistic choices 
to protect themselves from threat.  
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Appendix A – Inequality Stimuli 
 
Pilot Studies 
 
Pilot Study 1 (Black/White graph) 
 
[Title of graph was counterbalanced – half saw “Black vs. 
White” and half saw “White vs. Black”] 
 
Pilot Study 2 (Black/White passage) 
 “In the United States, Whites have an unemployment rate of 5.3%. That is, 5.3% of White Americans 
are looking for a job but unable to find one. Black Americans have an unemployment rate of 11.7%. So 
11.7% of Black Americans are looking for a job but unable to find one. Economists and social 
scientists have uncovered several reasons for this discrepancy, including difference in job training 
opportunities, different treatment by potential employers, difference in quality of education, and 
differences in the rate of incarceration. This gap between the two racial groups has been evident since 
the Bureau of Labor began measuring unemployment rates by race in 1947.” 
 
Pilot Study 3 (Male/Female graph) 
 
[Title of graph was counterbalanced – half saw “male and 
female” and half saw “female and male”] 
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Pilot Study 4 (Male/Female passage) 
“In the United States, men and women differ in their median income by approximately 28%. 
Economists and social scientists have uncovered much of this income disparity can be explained by 
differences in the way women and men are treated in the workplace. For example, women and men 
with equivalent job titles and skills often receive different bonuses, have different chances of being 
promoted despite similar job performance, and face different pressures at home. Although some argue 
that the income gap between men and women is the result of different choices, data from researchers 
paints a different picture: men and women face different obstacles and different treatment when it 
comes to their careers.” 
 
Study 1 
Legitimate Condition: 
“In the United States, outcomes for men and women differ in several ways. For 
example, men and women are not equally represented in politics, business, or many 
other high-profile professions. Annual incomes also tend to be different for men and 
women. Economists and social scientists have uncovered that many of these 
differences can be explained by differences in choices made by the men and women. 
For example, men and women have different priorities when it comes to working out 
of the house versus working in the house. Women and men also differ in how often 
they leave the workforce to take care of children. Although some argue that the 
income gap between men and women is the result of bias, data from researchers 
paints a different picture: men and women simply make different choices when it 
comes to career pursuits.” [order of men & women throughout passage was 
counterbalanced]  
Illegitimate Condition: 
 “In the United States, outcomes for men and women differ in several ways. For 
example, men and women are not equally represented in politics, business, or many 
other high-profile professions. Annual incomes also tend to be different for men and 
women. Economists and social scientists have uncovered that many of these 
differences can be explained by biases in the way men and women are treated in the 
workplace. For example, women and men with equivalent job titles and skills often 
receive different bonuses, have different chances of being promoted despite 
equivalent job performance, and face different pressures at home. Although some 
argue that the income gap between men and women is the result of different choices, 
data from researchers paints a different picture: men and women face different 
obstacles and different treatment when it comes to their careers.” [order of men & 
women throughout passage was counterbalanced]  
 
 
Study 2 
[In all articles, the order in which the campuses were mentioned throughout the article was 
counterbalanced] 
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Illegitimate, Advantaged Condition:  
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Illegitimate, Disadvantaged Condition: 
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Legitimate, Advantaged Condition: 
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Legitimate, Disadvantaged Condition 
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Studies 5, 6, & 7 
Advantage frame condition 
 “In the United States, economic outcomes for White Americans are consistently more 
positive than economic outcomes for Black Americans. For example, White citizens 
earn more than their Black counterparts when doing the same type of work with the 
same educational background. Studies have also shown that White job applicants are 
more likely than Black job applicants to be called back for job interviews, even when 
their resumes are identical. This pro-White bias also appears in other areas: 
compared to their Black counterparts, White Americans are over-represented in 
politics, in business, in mainstream TV and film, and at most colleges and 
universities. Being White gives you some other distinct advantages: being stopped by 
the police, being incarcerated, and being unemployed are all much less likely if you 
are White. Experts point to several reasons why this racial inequality persists in 
America. These include the country’s long history of slave ownership and 
segregation, as well as the more positive stereotypes about White people (vs. Black 
people) held by most Americans still today.” 
Disadvantage frame condition 
 “In the United States, economic outcomes for Black Americans are consistently more 
negative than economic outcomes for White Americans. For example, Black citizens 
earn less than their White counterparts when doing the same type of work with the 
same educational background. Studies have also shown that Black job applicants are 
less likely than White job applicants to be called back for job interviews, even when 
their resumes are identical. This anti-Black bias also appears in other areas: 
compared to their White counterparts, Black Americans are under-represented in 
politics, in business, in mainstream TV and film, and at most colleges and 
universities. Being Black gives you some other distinct disadvantages: being stopped 
by the police, being incarcerated, and being unemployed are all much more likely if 
you are Black. Experts point to several reasons why this racial inequality persists in 
America. These include the country’s long history of slavery and segregation, as well 
as the more negative stereotypes about Black people (vs. White people) held by most 
Americans still today.” 
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Appendix B – Dependent Measures & Other Stimuli 
 
Manipulation of Legitimacy Beliefs (Study 3) 
 
Legitimacy Prime (from McCoy & Major, 2007) 
Instructions: Each item below contains 5 words.  Your task is to create a grammatically 
correct sentence using 4 of the 5 words.  Please do them as quickly as you can and skip any 
that are too difficult.  You should not spend more than 5 minutes on this task. 
1. well independent do people class 
2. goals grow is accomplishing satisfying        
4. hat always seatbelt wear your         
1. usually diligence alone rewarded is        
2. fair close usually is life        
  
3. people are merit judge on        
  
4. a computer time calculator saves       
  
5. living opportunity earn good a       
  
6. agreeable moves ambition you forward      
  
7. effort positive prosperity leads to       
  
8. healthy crowd very competition is        
9. people responsible carry get ahead        
10. fun exercise can hard be        
  
11. to try persistence success leads       
  
12. encourage children dream to people        
13. effective had working independently is      
  
14. lots water of conserve drink         
15. you makes self-reliance strong causes      
  
16. hands keep clean nose your         
17. deserve people rich house it         
No Prime Control 
Instructions: Each item below contains 5 words.  Your task is to create a grammatically 
correct sentence using 4 of the 5 words.  Please do them as quickly as you can and skip any 
that are too difficult.  You should not spend more than 5 minutes on this task. 
1. cakes she fluffy likes cats       
2. warm are coats winter shiny       
3. hat always seatbelt wear your         
4. movies sad entertaining are action        
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5. gift is life a sound         
  
6. fun gatherings coffee are social       
  
7. a computer time calculator saves       
  
8. world around to sail the        
  
9. by college goes quickly time         
10. priceless friends are short good       
  
11. experience travels is an learning       
  
12. sunsets can beautiful short be         
13. fun exercise can hard be        
  
14. books open worlds count new        
15. on stay where sidewalk the          
16. classes offer development intellectual promote     
  
17. lots water of conserve drink          
18. football game is a sport        
  
19. hands keep clean nose your 
20. train romantic rides carriage are 
 
 
Math & Logic Question used as part of Threat Manipulation (Study 4) 
 
Easy (no threat condition): 
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Difficult (threat condition): 
 
 
Measures of Perceived Legitimacy of Inequality  
Perceived Legitimacy of Gender Inequality (adapted from Miron et al., 2006) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
1. American society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for 
achievement. 
2. In our society, men and women are treated equally. 
3. The existing wage gap between men and women is justified because they are doing different jobs. 
 
Perceived Legitimacy of Racial Inequality (adapted from Miron et al., 2006) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
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1. American society has reached the point where Black Americans and White American have equal 
opportunities for achievement. 
2. In our society, Whites and Blacks are treated equally. 
3. The existing inequalities between Whites and Blacks are justified. 
 
Perceived Legitimacy of UCSB Inequality (Study 2) 
1. The inequalities described in the article seem fair 
2. The inequalities described in the article need to be addressed and corrected 
3. Fixing the inequalities described in the article should be a top priority for the UC Administration 
4. The inequalities described in the passage do not need to be corrected 
5. The way in which resources are distributed in the UC System is fair 
 
 
 
Measures of Threat-Resolving Strategies 
System-Justification Scale (Studies 5 & 7). Adapted from O’Brien & Major, 2005; Levin, et 
al., 1998) 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
1. If people work hard they almost always get what they want. 
2. If people work hard enough, they can be whatever they want to be in life. 
3. Getting ahead in life doesn’t always depend on hard work. 
4. Even if people work hard, they don’t always get ahead. 
5. Our society is an open society where all individuals can achieve higher status. 
6. Advancement in our society is possible for all individuals. 
7. Individual members of certain groups have difficulty achieving higher status. 
8. Individual members of certain groups are often unable to advance in our society. 
9. Differences in status between groups in society are fair. 
10. Certain members of certain groups complain too much about differences that exist in society. 
11. Differences in status between groups in society are the result of injustice. 
12. It is unfair that certain groups in society have less than other groups. 
13. I feel that people get what they deserve. 
14. I feel that people treat each other with the respect that they deserve. 
15. I feel that people get what they are entitled to have. 
16. I feel that people earn the punishments and rewards they get. 
 
Self-Stereotyping Scale (Studies 5 & 7). Adapted from Leach et al., 2008 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
1. I have a lot in common with the average White person.  
2. I am similar to the average White person.  
 
White Ethnic Centrality Scale (Studies 5 & 7). Adapted from Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
1. Overall, being White has very little to do with how I feel about myself. 
2. Being White is an important reflection of who I am. 
3. Being White is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am. 
4. In general, being White is an important part of my self-image. 
 
Self-Enhancement Measure (Studies 6 & 7). Adapted from Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, 
Yurak, Vredenburg, et al., 1995) 
Please rate yourself on the following dimensions, as you believe you compare to the 
average American Adult of your background (please move the slider to the position 
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where you believe you fall). 0 ‘Much lower than average’ 50 ‘About average’ 100 
‘Much higher than average’: 
1. Dependable   
2. Intelligent  
3. Considerate  
4. Observant  
5. Polite 
  
6. Clear-headed 
7. Respectful  
8. Level-headed
  
9. Resourceful  
10. Bright 
  
11. Cooperative  
12. Honorable  
13. Reliable  
14. Perceptive  
15. Trustful  
16. Mature 
  
17. Friendly  
18. Creative  
19. Responsible  
20. Imaginative  
21. Meddlesome  
22. Insecure  
23. Spiteful  
24. Vain 
  
25. Complaining  
26. Gullible  
27. Deceptive  
28. Belligerent  
29. Disobedient  
30. Humorless  
31. Uncivil 
  
32. Unpleasant  
33. Snobbish  
34. Lazy 
  
35. Unstudious  
36. Liar   
37. Disrespectful 
38. Mean 
  
39. Unforgiving  
40. Maladjusted 
 
Anti-White Discrimination Scale (Studies 6 & 7). Adapted from Wilkins & Kaiser, 2014 
Please indicate your agreement with the following items (1 ‘Strongly Disagree’ – 7 ‘Strongly Agree’) 
1. Prejudice and discrimination against Whites are on the rise 
2. Whites are victims of racial bias 
3. Whites do not experience racism (reverse-scored)  
4. Whites experience discrimination  
5. Blacks and other racial groups benefit from preferential treatment that disadvantages Whites  
6. Reverse racism (where racial minorities are favored over Whites) is pervasive  
7. Only racial minorities experience negative out- comes based on their race (reverse-scored) 
 
 
